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Constitutional Personhood
Zoë Robinson*
ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, in a variety of high-profile cases, the Supreme
Court has grappled with difficult questions as to the constitutional personhood
of a variety of claimants. Of most note are the recent corporate constitutional
personhood claims that the protections of the First Amendment Speech and
Religion Clauses extend to corporate entities. Corporate constitutional personhood, however, is only a small slice of a broader constitutional question
about who or what is entitled to claim the protection of any given constitutional right. Beyond corporations, courts are being asked to answer very real
questions about a person’s constitutional status: Do aliens have the right to
bear arms? Do prisoners have the right to vote? Do children have a right to
privacy? Yet, while commentators and the Supreme Court have examined the
constitutional status of claimants independently, neither the Court nor scholars have examined the broader question of constitutional personhood.
This Article examines this critical question of constitutional personhood.
In doing so, this Article traverses concerns that are at once both deeply practical and at the core of constitutional theory. This Article then traces the historical and theoretical developments of constitutional personhood across three
classes of claimants who have most frequently and contentiously claimed the
protections of the Constitution: corporations, aliens, and felons. These case
studies demonstrate the difficulty in identifying when and under what conditions a class will be vested with constitutional personhood, with the Court vacillating in its approach to determining constitutional personhood both between
and within the classes. Examining these claimant classes in the aggregate, this
Article demonstrates that not only is a unified framework for answering questions of constitutional personhood desirable, but it is also constitutionally required. To that end, this Article proposes a unified approach to questions of
constitutional personhood, where both the purpose of the right and fit of the
claimant with that right are consistently considered.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly five years ago, in Citizens United v. FEC,1 the Supreme
Court revolutionized constitutional law when it declared “First
Amendment protection extends to corporations.”2 Politicians, scholars, and commentators publically derided the Court’s decision; in his
2010 State of the Union address President Barack Obama claimed
that the decision “reversed a century of law that . . . will open the
floodgates for special interests.”3 Unsurprisingly, when the Court
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 342.
3 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address. On the President’s
State of the Union remarks, see, for example, Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke,
in Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/politics/
29scotus.html. For scholarly commentary on the Court’s decision in Citizens United to extend
First Amendment speech rights to corporations, see, for example, Richard L. Hasen, Citizens
United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 584, 602 (2011) (claiming that
Citizens United will lead to inconsistency and incoherence in campaign finance law); Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 223 (2010) (recognizing the furor created by the decision and discussing its impact). But see Michael W.
McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 417 (2013)
1
2
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held that corporations were persons capable of exercising religious liberty in the June 2014 decision of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,4 commentators exploded.5 One political pundit proclaimed that the Court’s
recent corporate constitutional personhood decisions make the case
for a Twenty-Eighth Amendment, definitively declaring that “corporations are not people.”6 A popular bumper sticker ironically states,
“I’ll Believe Corporations Are People When Texas Executes One.”7
Yet, the recent examples of the Court’s vesting of constitutional
personhood in corporations are not unique. As fraught as the question of corporate constitutional personhood is, it is only a small slice
of a broader question about who or what is entitled to claim the protection of any given constitutional right. Beyond corporations, courts
are being asked to answer very real questions about a person’s constitutional status: Do prisoners have the right to vote? Do illegal aliens
have a right to bear arms? Do children have a right to privacy? Do
members of the press have the right to withhold information about
their sources?
Questions of constitutional personhood are not new. While the
issue of constitutional personhood is certainly in the midst of a resurgence, debates over a variety of persons’ capacity to claim the protection of the Constitution’s rights have a long history.8 Yet, while the
issue of constitutional personhood is both a historic and contemporary
(arguing that, once viewed through the lens of the Press Clause, the decision in Citizens United
was incontrovertibly correct).
4 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
5 Id. at 2768–69, 2775 (avoiding the constitutional claim and holding that corporations
were “persons” for the purposes of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). On the constitutional claims, see Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 10–11, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-356), 2014 WL 975500, at *1 (claiming that the Affordable Care
Act’s application to for-profit corporations violates the First Amendment Religion Clauses). Although the Court ultimately decided the issue on the narrower statutory grounds, the litigation
stands as an example of the potential of corporate constitutional personhood claims. See Micah
Schwartzman et al., The New Law of Religion, SLATE (July 3, 2014, 11:54 AM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/07/after_hobby_lobby_there_is_only_rfra_
and_that_s_all_you_need.html (discussing the doctrinal impact of Hobby Lobby).
6 Jeff Clements, The Case for a 28th Amendment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 25,
2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/07/25/pass-the-28th-amendmentto-ensure-corporations-are-not-people.
7 See, e.g., PEACE RESOURCE PROJECT, https://www.peaceproject.com/stickers/fullsize/illbelieve-corporations-are-people-when-texas-executes-one-bumper-sticker (last visited Mar. 8,
2016).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272–73 (1990); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 156–58 (1973); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405–06, 413 (1857).
For a discussion of the Court’s constitutional personhood determinations in these cases, see infra
notes 80–97, 194–204 and accompanying text.
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issue, the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the question.9
Instead, the question of who or what holds any given constitutional
right has been assessed on an ad hoc basis, right-by-right and claimant-by-claimant.10 The result is that under the Court’s jurisprudence,
the Constitution empowers different actors differently. While a corporation might have a right to privacy, an alien may not. While resident
aliens might have a right to vote, felons may not. While corporations
might have a right to religious freedom, a child may not. And so on.
In other words, the Court has vested different persons with different
constitutional rights.
But from where does the disparate treatment derive? By and
large the rights contained in the Constitution are inclusive, speaking
only of “people”11 or “person[s]”12 or, more narrowly, “citizens.”13
Yet, despite the generally inclusive nature of most constitutional
rights, the Court regularly limits the category of persons that qualify
to claim the protection of any given constitutional right.14 The basis
on which the Court grants or denies constitutional personhood is fluid,
and the Court’s constitutional personhood jurisprudence lacks any
clear or coherent framework for analyzing whether or when a claimant will be considered a constitutional person.15 Both within the same
class of claimant and as between different classes of claimants, “no
coherent body of doctrine or jurisprudential theory exists” to determine who or what is a constitutional person.16 Because the Court has
vested different persons with different constitutional rights,17 and on
9 See Karen E. Bravo, On Making Persons: Legal Constructions of Personhood and Their
Nexus with Human Trafficking, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 467, 478 (2011).
10 See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272–73; Roe, 410 U.S. at 156–58; Scott, 60 U.S.
at 405–06, 413.
11 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“[w]e the People”); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“the People”); id. amend. I
(“right of the people”); id. amend. II (same); id. amend. IV (same); id. amend. IX (“the people”); id. amend. X (same); id. amend. XVII (same).
12 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
13 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XI; id.
amend. XIV, § 1; id. amend. XIX.
14 See infra Part II and accompanying notes (analyzing the Court’s constitutional personhood jurisprudence).
15 See infra notes 326–57 and accompanying text (discussing the variety of interpretive
factors the Court has employed to determine whether constitutional personhood has vested in
the claimant).
16 Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal
Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2001) (making the claim in the general context of defining a legal person) [hereinafter What We Talk About].
17 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 383–84 (1911) (quoting Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906)) (holding corporations are not rights holders for the purpose of the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
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inconsistent grounds,18 it is not readily determinable who is entitled to
claim that the government has violated any given right. When and
why some persons are relegated to the sidelines of the Constitution,
then, remains amorphous.
Both the Court and scholars have all but overlooked the importance of a unified approach to the question of who or what is a constitutional person.19 Despite the contemporary importance of the
constitutional personhood status of corporations post-Citizens United
and Hobby Lobby, as well as the constitutional status of aliens, children, felons, women, the environment, states, and other persons, there
is limited study of the role and place of the critical question: who or
what is a constitutional person?20
Given the importance of this threshold question, it is surprising
that there has yet to be any serious attempt to examine the issue of
when, and under what conditions, any person has, or should have, any
given constitutional right.21 This Article begins to fill this gap. This
See What We Talk About, supra note 16, at 1747.
However, a small number of articles briefly touch on the broader question of constitutional personhood. See, e.g., Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005)
(“[T]he [Supreme] Court has never established a test to determine what a constitutional person
is . . . .”); Susanna Kim Ripken, Citizens United, Corporate Personhood, and Corporate Power:
The Tension Between Constitutional Law and Corporate Law, 6 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 285, 301 (2012) (“The bottom line is that the Supreme Court has never developed a unified theoretical justification [of personhood] under the Constitution.”); Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional
Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1445 (1992) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has failed to develop a coherent theory of constitutional personhood.”); What
We Talk About, at 1754.
20 On the popular constitutional personhood debate, see, for example, Nadia Imtanes,
Should Corporations Be Entitled to the Same First Amendment Protections As People?, 39 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 203, 214, 216 (2012); John Eastman, Symposium: No Free Lunch, But Dinner and a
Movie (and Contraceptives for Dessert)?, SCOTUSBLOG (July 17, 2014, 1:18 PM), http://www
.scotusblog.com/2014/07/symposium-no-free-lunch-but-dinner-and-a-movie-and-contraceptivesfor-dessert/; Christine Flowers, Liberal Women Are Big Whiners in Hobby Lobby Ruling, DAILY
TIMES OPINION (July 21, 2014, 2:33 AM), http://www.delcotimes.com/opinion/20140719/christineflowers-liberal-women-are-big-whiners-in-hobby-lobby-ruling; Micah Schwartzman & Nelson
Tebbe, Obamacare and Religion and Arguing off the Wall, SLATE (Nov. 26, 2013, 2:32 PM), http:/
/www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/obamacare_birth_control_man
date_lawsuit_how_a_radical_argument_went_mainstream.html.
21 The Author first noted this point in the context of defining constitutional religious institutions in Zoë Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 185 (2014).
Scholars have, however, examined the constitutional status of classes of claimants individually.
For example, there is a rich and growing body of literature on the constitutional rights of corporations post-Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, as well as a deep trend of immigration scholars
examining the constitutional rights of aliens. See, e.g., David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 368 (2003)
18
19
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Article explores the question of constitutional personhood by tracing
the historical and theoretical developments of constitutional personhood across three groups of claimants: corporations, aliens, and
felons.22 These three classes represent those persons who have most
consistently, frequently, and indeed, contentiously, claimed the protections of constitutional rights. While scholars have engaged with the
Court’s determinations of the constitutional status of each of these
groups independently, this Article views these three groups as examples from which to analyze the broader question.23 That is, the concern of this Article is not the constitutional personhood of
corporations, aliens, or felons, per se. Instead, each class represents a
slice of the Court’s approach to the broader question of constitutional
personhood. These case studies demonstrate that the Court’s approach to the question of constitutional personhood is substantively
flawed and vulnerable to attack. The case studies show that both
within and between the classes of claimants, the Court has vacillated
in its approach to answering the personhood question, relying variously on the right’s text, history, purpose, or some unstated conception of constitutional membership.
Aggregating the individual strands of jurisprudence into a
broader framework, this Article claims that a unified approach to the
personhood question is not only possible, but essential for constitutional legitimacy. Consequently, this Article argues that it is critical to
at least preliminarily outline a path forward that will provide a transparent and consistent baseline for constitutional personhood determinations going forward. In considering the difficult question of how to
best identify constitutional persons, this Article proposes taking a
functional approach and extending constitutional personhood to those
(“Are foreign nationals entitled only to reduced rights and freedoms? The difficulty of the question is reflected in the deeply ambivalent approach of the Supreme Court, an ambivalence
matched only by the alternately xenophobic and xenophilic attitude of the American public toward immigrants.”); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 1629, 1657 (“While the Court has significantly expanded corporate rights, it has not
grounded these expansions in a coherent concept of corporate personhood.”); Susanna Kim
Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After Citizens United: An Analysis of the Popular
Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209, 252
(2011); Anna Su, Speech Beyond Borders: Extraterritoriality and the First Amendment, 67 VAND.
L. REV. 1373, 1387–89 (2014) (examining the application of the Speech Clause outside of the
United States). But see Rivard, supra note 19, at 1447 (“[A] threshold question for determining
whether one is entitled to constitutional rights is whether one is a constitutional person.”).

R

22 See infra Part II (outlining the historical and theoretical developments of the constitutional personhood of corporations, aliens, and felons).
23

See supra note 21; infra Part II.
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persons that fulfill the purpose of the right in question.24 Arguably, a
functional approach is flexible enough to permit the courts to address
the panoply of claimants and rights, yet sufficiently constraining to
ensure consistency across all classes of claimants.
In doing so, this Article traverses concerns that are at once both
deeply practical and at the core of constitutional theory. At the periphery of the constitutional community exist classes of persons that
are perennially litigating claims in the federal courts. This Article’s
articulation and analysis of constitutional personhood, then, is in play
at the very core of constitutional rights litigation. Yet, questions of
constitutional personhood go beyond aiding judicial determinations in
case-by-case constitutional litigation and cut to the heart of what it
means to belong to the American polity. When the Court declares
that an alien is not a constitutional person for one or more rights, for
example, the Court is expressing a judgment about the value of that
class of claimant.25 In this way, judicial determinations of constitutional personhood are expressive in function. They reflect normative
judgments about status and entitlement to membership, and put the
Court at the frontline of determinations of the boundaries of the constitutional community.26 In a broader sense, then, recognition or nonrecognition as a constitutional person can affect the status and capacity of a person to function within the polity.27
24 See infra notes 374–82 and accompanying text (outlining a unified approach for constitutional personhood determinations).
25 Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1650–51 (2000) (“The thesis is that law influences behavior independent of the sanctions it
threatens to impose, that law works by what it says in addition to what it does.”); see also
Ripken, supra note 21, at 249 (“Law makes important statements about the intrinsic and relative
value of things. In the context of corporate personhood, for example, the law communicates
who counts as a legal person and tells us whether corporations hold the same place as individuals
under our legal system.” (footnote omitted)). Compare Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not
Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 725
(1998) (“Rights therefore serve as tools courts use to evaluate the social meanings and expressive dimensions of governmental action.”), with Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law:
A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2000) (“ ‘Expressivism’ is the standard
name within moral philosophy for a particular metaethical position. Metaethics is the branch of
moral philosophy that concerns the nature of morality.”).
26 See Karen E. Bravo, On Making Persons: Legal Constructions of Personhood and Their
Nexus with Human Trafficking, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 467, 474–75 n.29 (2011); Pildes, supra note
25, at 754; Ripken, supra note 21, at 252 (“From [the] perspective [of those seeking to abolish
corporate personhood-status], the legal doctrine of corporate personhood sends the message
that corporations count as persons in our society, that they possess the worth of a person under
our law, and that they deserve the same rights and respect natural persons are accorded in a
civilized world.”).
27 Linda Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69
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To this end, this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by
defining constitutional personhood and identifying the relevant constitutional provisions that give rise to questions about a litigant’s constitutional status. Part II examines the Court’s constitutional
personhood jurisprudence, tracing the historical and theoretical developments in the Court’s personhood jurisprudence through the lens of
a number of diverse constitutional persons, specifically corporations,
aliens, and prisoners. Parts III and IV comprise the analytic core of
this Article. Part III situates the constitutional personhood debate in
constitutional and political theory. This Article argues that the
Court’s constitutional personhood jurisprudence reflects normative
determinations about membership in the American polity. As such,
Part III claims that it is critical to begin to think about a transparent
and consistent approach to questions of constitutional personhood going forward. To that end, Part IV proposes the beginnings of a unified, functional framework for determining constitutional personhood
that focuses on the purpose of the right at issue, and measures the fit
of the claimant with that purpose in order to determine whether constitutional personhood should vest.
I.

THE OPEN QUESTION

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD

To begin with, what exactly is constitutional personhood?
Broadly, the term “personhood” has many connotations.28 Philosophers, for example, have long struggled with questions of moral personhood and determinations of who or what should be included in—
or excluded from—the concept of a person to whom moral agency
attaches.29 Yet, while the terms “person” and “personhood” generally
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1111 (1994) (arguing that status as a constitutional person is a determinant
of rights and burdens in the American polity).
28 See Edward Heath Robinson, An Ontological Analysis of States: Organizations vs. Legal
Persons, 5 APPLIED ONTOLOGY 109, 117–18 (2010) (discussing legal personhood); Alexander
Wendt, The State as Person in International Theory, 30 REV. INT’L STUD. 289, 294 (2004) (claiming that there are three types of persons, psychological persons, that “possess certain mental or
cognitive attributes,” legal persons, that “have rights and obligations in a community of law,”
and moral persons, that “are accountable for actions under a moral code”).
29 See, e.g., Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for Legal
Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 375–76 (2007) (discussing moral personhood); Jens David
Ohlin, Note, Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human Rights?, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
209, 213–14 (2005) (discussing the attributes necessary for personhood); see also Peter A.
French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 207, 210–11, 215 (1979). Compare Eva Feder Kittay, At the Margins of Moral Personhood, 116 ETHICS 100, 100 (2005) (arguing “that such intrinsic psychological capacities as rationality and autonomy” are not necessary
for moral personhood), with Jeff McMahan, Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice, 25
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 31–35 (1996) (arguing that human beings with cognitive impairments are
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denote a human being, “the technical legal meaning of a ‘person’ is a
subject of legal rights and duties.”30 Legal personhood, then, determines who or what is entitled to legal recognition.31 Importantly, the
“person” to whom the law extends can be either natural—referring to
human beings—or juridical—referring to an entity that is not a human
being, but for which the law extends some legal protections, for example corporations.32
Constitutional personhood refers to a specific form of legal personhood that denotes a person’s status as a constitutional rights
holder, entitled to the protective auspices of the rights contained in
the U.S. Constitution.33 Discussions of constitutional personhood are
not moral persons), and JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS
OF LIFE 253–54 (2002) (stating that the killing or death of persons that are not moral persons has
less significance than the killing or death of a designated moral person).
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 027: Persons and Personhood, LEGAL THELEXICON (Mar. 14, 2004) http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_theory_le_2.html (citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27
(Roland Gary ed., 2d ed. 1921)); see also Richard Tur, The ‘Person’ in Law, in PERSONS AND
PERSONALITY: A CONTEMPORARY INQUIRY 116, 116–27 (Arthur Peacocke & Grant Gillett eds.,
1987) (summarizing the legal construction of “person” across multiple areas of the law); Berg,
supra note 29, at 388–405 (discussing legal personhood in the context of embryos, fetuses, nonhuman animals, and artificial intelligence); Stephen C. Hicks, On the Citizen and the Legal Person: Toward the Common Ground of Jurisprudence, Social Theory, and Comparative Law as the
Premise of a Future Community, and the Role of the Self Therein, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 789, 808–21
(1991); Daniel N. Hoffman, Personhood and Rights, 19 POLITY 74, 74–78 (1986) (outlining the
fraught issues that defining “personhood” raises); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for
Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1238–39 (1991) (discussing the concept of legal
personhood in the context of artificial intelligence).
31 See Ngaire Naffine, Who are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects, 66 MOD. L. REV. 346, 346–50 (2003) (reviewing the jurisprudence concerning the definition
of legal personhood); What We Talk About, supra note 19, at 1746 (“[T]he law of the person
raises the fundamental question of who counts for the purpose of law.”).
32 Berg, supra note 29, at 372–74 (discussing the distinction between natural and juridical
persons). “Juridical persons are also referred to as ‘artificial,’ ‘juristic,’ and ‘fictitious/fictional’
persons.” Id. at 373 n.24 (citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
636 (1819)); see also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)
(“[a] corporation is an artificial being”); Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The
Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563, 563–65 (1987) (describing corporations as
“legal fictions”).
33 See Krannich, supra note 19, at 62; Ripken, supra note 21, at 301; What We Talk About,
supra note 19, at 1754 (“[T]he various theories of the person that American courts can deploy
permit virtually any result . . . . These different approaches have raised the question whether the
Court’s corporate personhood jurisprudence is purely result oriented.”); Rivard, supra note 19,
at 1446 (stating that “a constitutional person is one who is protected by the Constitution” and
examining the specific question of whether transgenic humanoid species can and should be designated constitutional persons). Note the dual character of constitutional rights—i.e., individual
rights or structural limitations—does not impact this analysis; under either characterization there
must be a subclass of litigants who are entitled to hold the government accountable. On the dual
30
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complicated at the outset by the nonuniform rights protections afforded by the Constitution.34 That is, on its terms, the Constitution
protects many different parties, including, but not limited to “persons.”35 The concept of constitutional personhood, then, involves a
need for careful definition of multiple categories of potential constitutional claimants, which collectively can be described as constitutional
personhood.36
At its broadest point, the rights contained in the Constitution
protect “the people” or “the People,”37 and a “Person” or “Persons.”38
Throughout the original Constitution, these references appear twentytwo times.39 In the Bill of Rights Amendments, the terms appear four
more times, and another twenty-three in the remaining Amendments.40 More narrowly, the rights in the Constitution extend to a
“Citizen” or “Citizens,”41 and more specifically, a “natural born Citizen.”42 While the Bill of Rights Amendments make no mention of
citizens for the purposes of designating rights holders, subsequent
rights-based amendments do limit rights-holding status to citizens.
For example, the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth,
and Twenty-Sixth Amendments refer to the rights of citizens with respect to voting rights.43
character of constitutional rights, see, for example, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 5 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132 (1991); Su, supra note 21, at 1389.
34 Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 300 (1990) (“[T]he Constitution does not uniformly describe the parties it
protects.”); Krannich, supra note 19, at 90 (“The problem presented by the corporate entity is
particularly striking in constitutional law, for ‘the Constitution does not uniformly describe the
parties it protects.’ ”).
35 See Blumberg, supra note 34, at 300–01.
36 See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3–5 (1996) (exploring the boundaries of the Constitution and the limits as to whom the Constitution applies); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty:
Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign
Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 17 (2002) (noting historically rooted questions regarding geographical
limitations to, and the popular scope of, the Constitution’s application).
37 See supra note 11.
38 See, e.g., supra note 12. A brief version of this analysis appeared in Robinson, supra
note 21, at 202–04 (undertaking a brief textual analysis of constitutional personhood for the
purpose of identifying constitutional religious institutions).
39 U.S. CONST. pmbl.–art. VII.
40 For the purposes of this Article, a “constitutional right” is defined to include all Amendments to the Constitution and those rights contained in Article I, Sections 9 and 10.
41 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend.
XI; id. amend. XIV, § 1; id. amend. XIX; id. amend. XXIV, § 1; id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
42 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
43 See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869) (stating that the term “citi-
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More narrowly still, constitutional rights are limited to a specific
and limited category of constitutional persons.44 In the rights-bearing
provisions, reference is made to three specific rights holders. The
Sixth Amendment right to a “speedy and public trial”45 by jury specifically references “the Accused,”46 rendering this right a limited constitutional right for persons in specific, constitutionally-defined
circumstances. Similarly, “the Owner” is referenced once in the
rights-bearing provisions in Article III, prohibiting the quartering of
soldiers without the owner’s consent.47 In addition, although somewhat debatable, the First Amendment restricts government abridgement of the freedom of “the Press.”48
Finally, some constitutional rights have no textually-designated
rights holder.49 Instead, these provisions are silent as to who can claim
their protections. In most instances the context is clear as to whom
the rights holder is intended to be. For example, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “excessive bail,” “excessive fines,” and “cruel
and unusual punishment” by its context applies to those accused and
convicted of a crime.50 Similarly, Article I, Section 10’s prohibition on
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws on its terms gives rise to a
right to those affected by any laws enacted contrary to the constitutional terms.51
This textual bifurcation between different categories of potential
constitutional claimants establishes an analytic predicate: the Constitution empowers certain textually demarcated persons to vindicate
constitutional violations.52 Faced with a constitutional challenge, it is
zen” applies only to natural persons); April Chung, Comment, Noncitizen Voting Rights and
Alternatives: A Path Toward Greater Asian Pacific American and Latino Political Participation, 4
UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 163, 164 (1996) (discussing the exclusion of noncitizens from the
political sphere); Hon. Karen Nelson Moore, Madison Lecture: Aliens and the Constitution, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 803–05 (2013) (discussing the constitutional personhood of aliens).
44 See infra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46 Id. (“the accused”).
47 See id. amend. III (“the owner”).
48 See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1028–29
(2011); see also David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 78–79 (1975)
(claiming that the freedom of the press is an exclusive right); Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 626–27 (1979) (arguing that the Press Clause
should not be interpreted as an exclusive right).
49 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; id. art. I, § 10; id. amend. I; id. amend. VII; id. amend.
VIII; id. amend XIII.
50 U.S. CONST. amend XIII.
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
52 See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship
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logical to expect that the initial judicial inquiry would be the antecedent question whether the claimant is entitled to raise the constitutional violation at all.53 On its terms, the Constitution presumes some
kind of identity-based distinction among potential rights holders.54
Each right is crafted to limit not only the substantive protections enshrined in the clause, but also the person to whom its protective auspices extend.55 A claim that a constitutional right has been violated,
then, assumes that the litigant is entitled to raise a claim against the
alleged rights-transgressor.56
It is not surprising that the Constitution selectively vests rights
depending on the nature of the claimant. The substantive protections
of constitutional rights are aimed at limiting transgressions of particular and often specific actions on the part of the government.57 That
the Constitution limits who (or what) can claim protection from any
constitutional transgression is naturally linked to the fact that constitutional rights themselves are calibrated to certain behavior.58 The
scope of a right and its related right-holder are intrinsically linked and
directed to preventing governmental actors acting in a certain manner
against a certain class of persons.59
All this is to say that the Constitution itself demands an answer to
the “who” question; every constitutional claim requires not only that
and the Right To Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1532–33 (2010); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 11, 13 (1985). On the structure of judicial review, see HENRY M. HART, JR. &
HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 14–17, 89–91 (1st ed.
1953); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1006
(2011) [hereinafter Rosenkranz, Objects]; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1212–24 (2010) [hereinafter Rosenkranz, Subjects].
53 Nicholas Rosenkranz makes the claim that, “[i]f one were approaching constitutional
law for the first time, one might have expected every constitutional judicial opinion to begin with
the alleged constitutional culprit, the subject of the claim”; that is, who is violating the Constitution. See Rosenkranz, Subjects, supra note 52, at 1214. However, this Article argues that this
claim fails to account for those persons entitled to challenge the actions of the constitutional culprit. On theories of rights, see generally THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy Waldron ed., 6th ed.
1984).
54 Gulasekaram, supra note 52, at 1532–33.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 1534–35.
57 See, e.g., Rosenkranz, Objects, supra note 52, at 1006; Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate
the Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons Learned from the Repeal of Prohibition to the
Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 219 (1995) (“[O]ur Constitution’s provisions, even when they don’t say so expressly, limit only some appropriate level of government.”
(footnote omitted)).
58 See supra note 52 and accompanying text; Rosenkranz, Subjects, supra note 52, at
1224–26 (asking “when” a Constitutional right is violated).
59 See Tribe, supra note 57, at 219.
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someone violate a constitutional restriction, but also that the person
bringing the claim is constitutionally empowered to vindicate that violation.60 That is, it is essential to answer the question of who is entitled to raise a question that her constitutional right has been violated
prior to any further judicial review.61
And here is where much of the confusion lies over the issue of
constitutional personhood. The “who” question of constitutional adjudication is almost always painted as one of constitutional standing,
where the question is “who are [the] proper parties to a constitutional
case?”62 Yet the question of a litigant’s rights-holder status—her constitutional personhood—is not answered by the doctrine of constitutional standing.63 Any characterization of constitutional personhood
as one of standing conflates two related, but ultimately analytically
distinct, inquiries.
The basic standing doctrine stipulates that in order to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement—the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing—a plaintiff must “demonstrate that he
has suffered ‘injury in fact,’ that the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the
actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by
a favorable decision.”64 The standing doctrine aims to capture those
litigants that demonstrate a “personal stake” in the suit.65 More specifically, the standing doctrine attempts to disaggregate those litigants
60 See Rosenkranz, Objects, supra note 52, at 1006; Rosenkranz, Subjects, supra note 52, at
1246 (together arguing that the critical predicate questions of judicial review are both the identity of the subject of the constitutional provision and the object of the constitutional provision).
61 See Rosenkranz, Subjects, supra note 52, at 1247.
62 Id. (emphasis omitted) (discussing William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98
YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988)); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (“Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be [seized] in a similar way, Lyons is no more
entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles; and a federal court may not
entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of law
enforcement officers are unconstitutional.”); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980)
(“Today we hold that defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits
of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated.”).
63 Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 95, 136 (2014) (standing can be a “useful guide” to understand rights-holder status, but the
Supreme Court has not framed the issue in respect to constitutional personhood).
64 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1982)); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The standing doctrine
has been subject to strong criticism; see, for example, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[C]onstitutional standing [is] a word game played by secret rules.”);
Fletcher, supra note 62, at 221 (“The structure of standing law in the federal courts has long been
criticized as incoherent.”); Rosenkranz, Subjects, supra note 52, at 1247.
65 Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011).
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who have constitutional permission to bring an action to vindicate a
previously violated right.66
The question of standing undertakes an entirely different inquiry
than presented when we ask the question: is this claimant a constitutional rights holder? At base, standing is about who can vindicate the
violation of a right, not who holds the right.67 While status as a constitutional rights holder is likely a necessary predicate for standing
where a constitutional rights violation is claimed, the converse is not
accurate. That is, standing is not a necessary predicate for constitutional personhood.68 Take the case of See v. City of Seattle,69 where a
corporate claimant argued that the Fourth Amendment prevented Seattle’s fire inspectors from entering its commercial premises.70 It
seems clear that the corporation could satisfy the constitutional standing test: it suffered an injury (the searching of their commercial premises), that injury was traceable to the government’s policy of fire
inspections, and an injunction preventing future searches would remedy the injury.71 Yet, the Court held the Fourth Amendment’s Search
and Seizure Clause inapplicable to corporations on the basis that the
corporation was not entitled to the protections of the claimed right.72
That is, a constitutional personhood does not vest in corporations for
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause.73
In addition, the converse is true: a person may not meet the
standing requirements, yet still be a designated rights holder for any
given constitutional right.74 For example, a Catholic citizen of the
United States has the right to the free exercise of her religion.75 She is
a constitutional rights holder for the purposes of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.76 However, unless the government
somehow violates her religious liberty, she will not satisfy the Article
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577–78.
See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? LAW, MORALITY, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 35–44 (3d ed. 2010).
68 Id. at 35–36.
69 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). For a discussion of the case, see infra notes
144–46 and accompanying text.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 541–42.
72 Id. at 546; see Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of
Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 629–30 (1990) (discussing the modern period of corporate constitutional personhood).
73 Mayer, supra note 72, at 629–30.
74 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
75 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
76 See Robinson, supra note 21, at 187 (describing constitutional personhood in the specific
context of the First Amendment Religion Clauses).
66
67
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III standing requirements.77 Of course, the Catholic citizen of the
United States whose religious liberty has not been violated will be
unlikely to bring a claim in federal court.78 But the point remains:
compared to the question of constitutional personhood, standing captures both too little and too much, and fails to describe the Court’s
constitutional personhood decisions. Constitutional personhood,
then, is analytically distinct from standing, asking instead whether the
claimant is entitled to claim the protections of the right.
Yet, from the initial observation that identifying constitutional
personhood is a requirement antecedent to merits review, a second
observation follows: for the most part, the persons empowered by the
Constitution to vindicate rights violations are broadly inclusive and
textually indeterminate.79 This indeterminacy helps explain why disputes about constitutional personhood have both persisted in and
vexed the members of the Court.
With this indeterminacy in mind, what remains is to consider how
the Court has approached questions of constitutional personhood.
Part II begins to answer this question by analyzing the Court’s approach to this antecedent question across three classes of litigants.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

This Part has three core goals. First, as noted above, this Part
charts the trajectory of the Court’s approach to questions of constitutional personhood through the lens of three classes of persons claiming to be constitutional rights holders: corporations, aliens, and felons.
These three groups were chosen for their diversity, as well as the long
tradition of claimants from these classes arguing that they are constitutional rights holders. The Court’s treatment of claims evidences an
individualistic approach to questions of constitutional personhood,
both as between the different classes of claimants and within the same
claimant class.80 Second, examining the Court’s jurisprudence in its
various temporal and identity-based contexts provides the foundations
for Part III’s claim that the Court’s current approach to constitutional
personhood is unsatisfactory. Finally, foreshadowing the purposive
approach this Article takes to questions of constitutional personhood
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.
See STONE, supra note 67, at 36.
79 See Henkin, supra note 52, at 12 (commenting that “the Constitution provides virtually
no guidance for [the] resolution” of constitutional personhood claims).
80 See, e.g., West, supra note 48, at 1048 (discussing the Court’s lack of doctrinal uniformity
in the context of the Press Clause).
77
78
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in Part IV, this Part has the goal of beginning to identify and tease out
those common factors that drive the Court’s personhood decisions.
This jurisprudential overview, then, provides the essential background
for developing a workable framework for constitutional personhood
determinations going forward.81
Before turning to the specific case studies, it turns out that the
Court has expressly addressed the question of constitutional personhood in at least two of its most high profile cases, Dred Scott v.
Sandford82 and Roe v. Wade.83 In Roe v. Wade, the State of Texas,
supported by a number of amici, argued that a fetus is a “person” for
the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.84
In addressing the question posed, the Court engaged in a brief, one
paragraph structural analysis of whether a fetus is a “person” for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes. It did so by counting the number
of times the term “person” appears in the Constitution, concluding
that “in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it
has application only postnatally.”85 The Court said that this structural-textual analysis, coupled with historic practice of permissive access to abortion in the nineteenth century,86 “persuades us that the
word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”87 For the Court, this brief statement was all that
was necessary to deal with the antecedent question of whether the
unborn can claim constitutional personhood.88
81 This is a common analytical approach for scholars of constitutional rights holders. See,
e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 33 (2014) (analyzing
case law to determine aspects of corporate personhood); Robinson, supra note 21, at 185; West,
supra note 48, at 1047–48 (discussing personhood determination of the press).
82 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405–06 (1857) (holding that constitutional personhood did not vest in African Americans). On the import of the Dred Scott decision
generally, see, for example, MARK A. GRABER, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional
Evil 3–4 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds. 2006); Daniel A. Farber, A Fatal Loss of Balance: Dred Scott
Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 13, 24 (2011); Allen R. Kamp, The Birthright Citizenship Controversy: A Study of Conservative Substance and Rhetoric, 18 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 49, 53 (2012).
83 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156 (1973); see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Plausibility of
Personhood, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 14 (2013) (discussing fetal constitutional personhood).
84 Roe, 410 U.S. at 156; Brief for Appellee, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18),
1971 WL 134281, at *8, *31.
85

Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.

Id. at 158 (“[O]ur observation . . . that throughout the major portion of the 19th century
prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word
‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”).
86

87

Id.

88

Id.
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The Court also faced the issue of constitutional personhood in the
infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford decision.89 There the Court addressed the question whether Scott, or any black person, had the right
to sue in federal court as a citizen of any state.90 The Court answered
with a resounding “no.”91 Engaging in a limited version of originalism, the Court held that blacks could never be citizens of the United
States nor could they ever be “member[s] of the political community
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution . . . and . . .
entitled to all the rights . . . guaranteed by that instrument.”92 With
little analysis, Chief Justice Taney declared that blacks
are not included, and were not intended to be included,
under the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United
States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as
a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or
not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no
rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and
the Government might choose to grant them.93
According to Taney, blacks were “so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect.”94 It is trite to say
that the Court’s analysis of constitutional personhood for African
Americans in the Dred Scott decision has been universally rejected.95
Indeed, the decision and its exclusion of African Americans from constitutional personhood precipitated the Civil War and, eventually, the
Civil War Amendment to the Constitution, expressly declaring African Americans constitutional persons, at least in some regards.96
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
Id. at 406.
91 See id. at 404.
92 Id. at 403.
93 Id. at 405–06.
94 Id. at 407.
95 GRABER, supra note 82, at 16 (“[T]he Dred Scott decision was a ‘self-inflicted wound’
that almost destroyed the Supreme Court.”); Austin Allen, Rethinking Dred Scott: New Context
for an Old Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 141, 141 (2006) (“Almost everyone despises Dred Scott v.
Sandford.”); Farber, supra note 82, at 24.
96 On Dred Scott and citizenship see, for example, Gulasekaram, supra note 52, at 1553–54
(“By abolishing slavery and expanding the racial inclusiveness of citizenship, the Reconstruction
Amendments had the consequence of allowing, at least in theory, newly minted black citizens to
bear arms.”); Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 271 (1997); see also
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Guns and Membership in the American Polity, 21 WM. & MARY BILL
89
90
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With limited express guidance from the Court on the question of
constitutional personhood, this Article turns to examine the Court’s
grants and denials of constitutional personhood across a specific subset of constitutional claimants.97 In doing so, the goal is to begin to
compile a composite of how the Court deals with questions of constitutional personhood in order to identify the dominant themes and to
begin to develop a framework for future cases.
A.

Corporations

While the term “corporation” does not appear in the Constitution,98 over the past 100 or so years the Court has interpreted the Constitution such that corporations are constitutional persons for an
extensive array of constitutional rights.99 Working chronologically
from the First Amendment, currently corporations are constitutional
persons for the purposes of the First Amendment Free Speech and
Free Press Clauses.100 Corporations are also constitutional persons for
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,101 as well as a limited form of the
Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy.102 Corporations are constitutional persons for the Fifth Amendment’s prohibitions against double
jeopardy,103 as well as takings.104 However, the Court expressly disRTS. J. 619, 622 (2012) (“Even in present day, over twenty states and the federal government
maintain alienage restrictions in their firearms statutes, differentiating between citizens and
noncitizens for certain aspects of firearm purchase and possession.”).
97 The case studies do not purport to be a comprehensive overview of the caselaw in each
of the three areas; rather, the case studies draw on the core relevant cases that illuminate the
Court’s discussion of rights-holder status (i.e., constitutional personhood).
98 See Lucien J. Dhooge, Human Rights for Transnational Corporations, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L
L. & POL’Y, 197, 201 (2007) (“[T]he term ‘corporation’ does not appear in either the U.S. Constitution or the Bill of Rights.”); Mayer, supra note 72, at 579 (“The Constitution does not mention
corporations.”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 909 (2011) (“ ‘Corporations’ do not appear in the text of the Constitution.”).
99 For a discussion on the historic understanding of corporate constitutional rights, see
Mayer, supra note 72; Pollman, supra note 21; Beth Stephens, Are Corporations People? Corporate Personhood Under the Constitution and International Law, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2013).
100 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 244, 249–51 (1936); Miller, supra note 98, 910–11 (similarly summarizing the constitutional rights of corporations).
101 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978).
102 See Miller, supra note 98, at 910; see also FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1179
(2011); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 650–52 (1950); Fleck & Assocs. v. City of
Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
103 See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977); Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962); see also V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability:
What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1517 n.211 (1996) (stating that double
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avowed them as rights holders for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.105 In addition, the Court
has held that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantees to a right to trial by
jury and counsel extend to protect corporations,106 though the federal
courts have not extended the right to appointed counsel to corporations.107 Finally, while the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
and Procedural Due Process Clauses108 and some of the incorporated
Bill of Rights protections also extend to corporations,109 the Privileges
and Immunities Clause does not.110
As a number of leading corporate law scholars have noted, the
Court’s extension and expansion of constitutional rights to corporations has often occurred without any justification by the Court.111 In
fact, the case considered by many scholars as the seminal case groundjeopardy protection “is only available against government suits brought with the object of punishment . . . .”); Pollman, supra note 21, at 1656 n.166 (explaining that many rights of corporations relate to the “Court’s recognition of the corporation as subject to criminal liability.”).
104 See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (constitutional
personhood vests foreign corporation for purpose of Fifth Amendment takings clause).
105 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 383–84 (1911) (holding corporations are not
rights holders for the purpose of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906). On the development of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights of corporations, see generally Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal
Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal
Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 826–40 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 814–18 (2005).
106 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970).
107 See, e.g., United States v. Unimex, Inc., 991 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Being incorporeal, corporations cannot be imprisoned, so they have no constitutional right to appointed
counsel.”). But see Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(“It appears beyond sensible debate that corporations . . . do indeed enjoy the right to retain
counsel.”).
108 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413–14 (1984); Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S.
394, 396 (1886).
109 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (corporations are rights
holders for some First Amendment rights).
110 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869) (“The term citizens . . . applies only to
natural persons, . . . not to artificial persons created by the legislature . . . .”).
111 For excellent discussions of the Court’s vacillating methodology for determining corporate constitutional personhood, see Mayer, supra note 72, at 629, 650; Miller, supra note 98, at
909 (“[C]orporations fall within a category of entities protected by the Constitution, sometimes.
No unified theory governs when or to what extent the Constitution protects a corporation.”);
Pollman, supra note 81, at 50 (“[T]he Court has confronted issues concerning the applicability
and scope of constitutional protections for corporations for over two hundred years. In all of
this time, it has failed to articulate a test or standard approach for its rulings.”); Pollman, supra
note 21, at 1630 (“Over time, however, the Court expanded the doctrine without a coherent
explanation or consistent approach.”); Rivard, supra note 19, at 1465 (stating that the Court’s
approach to corporate constitutional personhood lacks doctrinal and instead reflects “[o]nly
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ing the grant of constitutional rights-holder status to corporations, the
1896 case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,112
extended constitutional personhood to corporations absent any argument by counsel on the issue before, and without any analysis in the
opinion.113 Holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause extended to corporations, Chief Justice Waite specified
before oral argument commenced that:
The [C]ourt does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it
does.114
Similarly, the earlier case of Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad115 made Fifth Amendment Due Process protections available to
corporations, without analysis or reasons.116 There, the Court held
that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibited the Secretary of the Interior from revoking his earlier approval for a right-ofway over public land. The Court claimed simply that, “[a] revocation
of the approval of the Secretary of the Interior . . . by his successor in
office was an attempt to deprive the plaintiff of its property without
due process of law, and was, therefore, void.”117
[l]egal [c]onclusions”); Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, Note, The Case for Applying the Eighth
Amendment to Corporations, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1317–24 (1996).
112 Santa Clara Cnty. v. So. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (addressing the question of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibited California from taxing the
property of a railroad company differently from the property of an individual). For commentary
on the decision, see Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121,
1123–25 (2000).
113

See Warren, supra note 111, at 1317.

Santa Clara Cty., 118 U.S. at 396; see also Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S.
562, 574 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“It has consistently been held by this Court that the
Fourteenth Amendment assures corporations equal protection of the laws, at least since
1886 . . . .”); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897) (“It is well settled that
corporations are persons within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”); Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592
(1896) (“It is now settled that corporations are persons within the meaning of the constitutional
provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of law, as well as a denial
of the equal protection of the laws.”); Mayer, supra note 72, at 581; Robert Sherrill, Hogging the
Constitution: Big Business & Its Bill of Rights, 7 GRAND STREET 95, 106 (1987).

R

114

115 Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893). For an excellent overview of
this decision, see Mayer, supra note 72, at 590–91.
116

Noble, 147 U.S. at 176.

117

Id.; see Pollman, supra note 21, at 1646 (discussing the case).
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Yet, despite the Court simply declaring corporations as rights
holders in a number of contexts, there are instances where the Court
has engaged in an analysis of the corporation as a constitutional person.118 The following paragraphs will outline a handful of core cases
that are illustrative of the Court’s approach to corporate constitutional personhood more generally. Although, as commentators have
noted, there is no consistent, unified approach across the Court’s corporate constitutional personhood cases,119 arguably the cases can be
best understood in two separate tranches of caselaw: those cases decided before 1960 and those decided after 1960.120 The distinction is
significant. Before the 1960s, the Court resorted to corporate theory—albeit in an ad hoc, ungrounded manner—to determine whether
to grant or deny the protection of any given constitutional right.121 In
the post-1960s cases, however, the Court abandoned its recourse to
theories of corporate personhood and, at least in those cases where it
undertook any analysis when extending a constitutional right to corporations, seemingly focused on the history, structure, and purpose of
the right on which the corporations were relying.122
1. Pre-1960s Constitutional Corporate Personhood Cases
The Court’s early approach to corporate constitutional persons
rested on ad hoc recourse to various, and often competing, theories of
corporate personality.123 One scholar aptly describes the Court’s approach in this early period of corporate constitutional personhood as
“schizophrenic.”124 Initially, the Court relied on the artificial entity
theory of corporate personality and was skeptical of corporate claims
of constitutional personhood. In Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,125 for example, the Court held that “[a] corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either exSee infra Part II.A.1 and accompanying notes.
Miller, supra note 98, at 909 (“No unified theory governs when or to what extent the
Constitution protects a corporation.”); Rivard, supra note 19, at 1465 (“Rather than developing
a coherent theory of constitutional personhood, the Supreme Court has used only pragmatic
concerns to derive a legal conclusion of constitutional personhood.”).
120 Mayer, supra note 72, at 620–21; Warren, supra note 111, at 1320.
121 Mayer, supra note 72, at 626 (“The Court championed, and then abandoned, corporate
theory.”); Pollman, supra note 21, at 1647.
122 See Pollman, supra note 21, at 1655.
123 See id.; Mayer, supra note 72, at 580.
124 Mayer, supra note 72, at 621.
125 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
118
119
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pressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”126 On this view, corporations were regularly denied constitutional protections.127
Yet, over time, the Court occasionally began to embrace a second
theory of corporate personality—the natural entity theory.128 Often
the Court would rely on both theories in the one case to extend constitutional personhood under one right, but deny it under another.129 In
Hale v. Henkel,130 for example, the corporation claimed that a subpoena for corporate documents violated the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.131 Denying that the privilege against
self-incrimination extended to protect corporations, the Court stipulated that the words “no person” in the Fifth Amendment extended
only to natural persons.132 According to Carl Mayer, in reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on an artificial entity theory of the corporation, specifying that because the corporation is a creation of the
state, the state can limit its powers by law.133 Moreover, Mayer also
noted that the Court specified that while “an individual may refuse to
answer incriminating questions, . . . a corporation may not if it is
charged with an abuse of its state-conferred privileges.”134
In a somewhat bizarre twist, the Hale Court unilaterally raised
the question whether a corporation is entitled to the protections of the
Fourth Amendment’s Unreasonable Search and Seizures Clause.135
Id. at 636; see also Rivard, supra note 19, at 1456.
See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 99 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he court answered, that corporations were not citizens within the meaning of this clause;
that the term citizens as there used applied only to natural persons, members of the body politic
owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature and possessing
only the attributes which the legislature had prescribed . . . .”). On Dartmouth College, see
Pollman, supra note 21, at 1635–36.
128 Mayer, supra note 72, at 580–81.
129 See Warren, supra note 111, at 1319 (discussing Hale v. Henkel and the Court’s intraopinion vacillation between methods of determining corporate personality).
130 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
131 Id. at 46; see also Mayer, supra note 72, at 592–93 (discussing Hale).
132 Hale, 201 U.S. at 75; see also Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122 (1957) (“It is
settled that a corporation is not protected by the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.”); Lance Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine in the New Era of Limited Liability Entities—Should Business Entities Have a Fifth Amendment Privilege?, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 9 (explaining that the Supreme Court has held that corporations are entitled to Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination).
133 Mayer, supra note 72, at 621–22; see Hale, 201 U.S. at 75; see also Miller, supra note 98,
at 925–26 (discussing the case).
134 Mayer, supra note 72, at 623 (analyzing the decision).
135 Hale, 201 at 76; see Mayer, supra note 72, at 592 (“The Court raised the question, on its
own, whether a corporation is entitled to fourth amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986)
126
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Even more bizarrely, the Court relied on a different theory of corporate personality than it had for the Fifth Amendment analysis, to answer this question in the affirmative.136 The Court specified that as a
“distinct legal entity,”137 an “association of individuals under an assumed name,” the corporation had a right to independent protection
of the Fourth Amendment.138 This vacillation between different theories of corporate personality internal to Hale would be repeated in
subsequent cases: where the Court held that a corporation was an artificial entity, the Court would deny that constitutional personhood
vested in the corporation, and, conversely, where the Court considered the corporation a natural entity, it could grant constitutional personhood.139 For example, the Court relied on the artificial entity
theory in United States v. Morton Salt Co.140 when it denied the corporation’s claim to Fourth Amendment privacy rights.141 The Court
specified that “corporations can claim no equality with individuals in
the enjoyment of a right to privacy . . . . The Federal Government
allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors
from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of
regulation.”142
2. Post-1960s Constitutional Corporate Personhood Cases
As some corporate law scholars have noted, after 1960, the Court
abruptly ceased relying on theories of corporate personality in cases
of corporate claims to constitutional rights-holding status and instead
began to ask whether the constitutional right being claimed should
extend to corporations.143 The 1967 decision of See v. City of Seattle144
grounds the Court’s shift from corporate personality theory to an
(explaining that a corporation has an expectation of privacy for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment).
136 Hale, 201 U.S. at 76.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Mayer, supra note 72, at 628.
140 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
141 Id. at 652; see Miller, supra note 98, at 919 (discussing the case in the context of an
extended analysis of artificial entity theory); see also Pollman, supra note 81, at 34–37 (engaging
in an extended discussion of the case).
142 Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652 (citations omitted).
143 Mayer, supra note 72, at 620–21, 629; Pollman, supra note 21, at 1655 (“The 1960s
marked the beginning of a major expansion of corporate constitutional rights and protections.”);
Warren, supra note 111, at 1320 (“After 1960, the Court stopped pondering expressly the nature
of corporate personhood and began focusing on the amendment at issue.”).
144 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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amendment-focused approach.145 There, the corporate claimant challenged the City of Seattle’s fire inspection system, claiming that the
inspection process violated the Fourth Amendment’s Unreasonable
Search and Seizures Clause.146 While the Court relied on the line of
authority beginning with Hale, Carl Mayer argues that “the Court ignored the competing theories of the corporation” it had developed in
its earlier cases.147 Instead, the Court “analogized official entries upon
commercial property to administrative subpoenas and held that it is
untenable for subpoenas to be subject to fourth amendment limitations that are inapplicable to actual searches and inspections of ‘commercial premises.’”148
From this point onwards, the Court has not returned to its pre1960 corporate theory analysis. Instead, in determining whether constitutional personhood in the claimed right should extend to corporations, the Court examines the right being claimed to ascertain whether
vesting the corporation with constitutional personhood would serve
the purpose of the right.149
In Ross v. Bernhard,150 for example, the corporate claimant argued that the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury extended to
stockholders’ derivative actions.151 After examining the history of the
Seventh Amendment right, and the scope of application of the right at
the time of the adoption of the Amendment, the Court agreed that the
protection of the Seventh Amendment extends to corporations.152
The Court undertook a careful analysis of the types of common law
actions that the Seventh Amendment was intended to preserve, concluding that the shareholder derivative suit fit into the category of a
suit whose right to a trial by jury was preserved by the Seventh
Amendment.153 In so doing, the Court expressly disavowed the rele145 Id. at 545–46. For a robust discussion of the case, see Mayer, supra note 72, at 629–30
(claiming that the decision “inaugurated the move away from personhood theory”).
146 See, 387 U.S. at 541–42.
147 Mayer, supra note 72, at 630.
148 Id.
149 See Pollman, supra note 21, at 1655 (“Sometimes echoes of earlier conceptions of the
corporation have reverberated in the case law or the Court has focused on the history or purpose
of the amendment at issue on an ad hoc basis.”); Warren, supra note 111, at 1320, 1323.
150 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
151 Id. at 532.
152 Id. at 531–33; see Warren, supra note 111, at 1320–21 (discussing the decision).
153 Ross, 396 U.S. at 533. The dissent disagreed, holding that “this Rule, like the Amendment itself, neither restricts nor enlarges the right to jury trial. Indeed nothing in the Federal
Rules can rightly be construed to enlarge the right of jury trial . . . .” Id. at 543–44 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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vance of theories of corporate personality,154 and instead relied exclusively on an historic analysis of the Amendment at issue.155 The Court
took a similar approach in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.156
There, when considering whether the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause extended to protect corporations, the Court traced the
history of the Clause, focusing in on the purpose of the prohibition
against double jeopardy.157 The Court specified that the purpose of
the Clause is to preclude repeated conviction attempts against any
person given the potential for embarrassment, expense, and the insecurity associated with repeated conviction attempts.158 Subsequently,
the Court held that the Clause extended to the corporate claimant,
without any attempt to link that stipulated purpose of the Clause to
the nature of the claimant (i.e., the corporation). Instead, the Court
seemed to assume that extending constitutional personhood in this instance would achieve those purposes.159
The Court continued with this approach in what is considered one
of the Court’s most critical Fourth Amendment decisions, Marshall v.
Barlow’s, Inc.160 In Marshall, the Court was asked to determine
whether the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause extended to protect a corporation from surprise inspections from Occupational Safety
and Health Administration.161 In concluding that it does, the Court
analyzed the history of the Clause, reflecting on the role and protections of merchants in the colonies post-revolution, and arguing the
Clause was intended to cover “commercial buildings” as well as private property.162 In adopting a historical purpose approach to resolving the question of corporate constitutional personhood in the Fourth
Amendment context, the Court expressly rejected the government’s
invitation to rely on theories of corporate personhood.163 Mayer notes
Id. at 531 (majority opinion).
Id. at 533–34.
156 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
157 Id. at 568–69.
158 Id. at 569 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957)); see also
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963). This point is discussed in Warren, supra
note 111, at 1320.
159 Mayer, supra note 72, at 635–36; Warren, supra note 111, at 1320 (“[The Court] apparently assumed that applying double jeopardy to corporations accomplishes these goals.”).
160 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 324–25 (1978) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects corporations against warrantless inspections by workplace safety regulators). This
point is discussed by Mayer, supra note 72, at 608–09; Warren, supra note 119, at 1321.
161 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 311.
162 Id. at 311–12.
163 See Mayer, supra note 72, at 631.
154
155
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that “[t]he Court easily could have adopted the artificial entity analysis of Morton Salt to circumscribe narrowly corporate rights, but chose
not to do so.”164
As Elizabeth Pollman notes, the closest the Court has come to
establishing a test for determining the rights-holder status of corporations was in in the 1978 case of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.165 In Bellotti, the Court was asked to determine whether a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting campaign contributions by corporations violated the First Amendment’s Speech Clause.166 The Court explicitly rejected the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s reliance on
corporate theory; the lower court had held that individuals enjoy
broader First Amendment protections than corporations and that the
First Amendment does not extend to protect corporate speech.167 The
Court stated that the reliance on corporate personality as a guide for
determining rights-holder status was “an artificial mode of analysis.”168 Instead, the Court said, the proper mode of analysis is to determine whether a right is “purely personal” or not.169 Explaining this
distinction, the Court specified that:
Certain “purely personal” guarantees, such as the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the “historic function” of the particular guarantee has been limited to the
protection of individuals. Whether or not a particular guarantee is “purely personal” or is unavailable to corporations
for some other reason depends on the nature, history, and
purpose of the particular constitutional provision.170
However, as Pollman notes, the Court “has not consistently used this
approach”171 for resolving claims of corporate constitutional
personhood.172
164 Id. But see Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598–99 (1981) (distinguishing between the
privacy accorded to commercial property and that of an individual’s home in holding that the
warrantless search provisions of MSHA did not violate the company’s Fourth Amendment
rights).
165 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding that the First Amendment protects political speech through corporate financial contributions to influence referendum
and electoral campaigns); see Pollman, supra note 81, at 52; see also Mayer, supra note 72, at 615;
Miller, supra note 98, at 911; Warren, supra note 119, at 1321.
166 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
167 See id. at 777–78; Mayer, supra note 72, at 615.
168 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779.
169 See id. at 778 n.14.
170 Id. (citation omitted); see also Pollman, supra note 81, at 25.
171 See Pollman, supra note 81, at 53.
172 Id.

R
R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\84-3\GWN302.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 27

CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD

5-MAY-16

14:46

631

The most recent case where the Court determined corporate constitutional personhood is the 2010 decision in Citizens United v.
FEC.173 There, the Court was asked to determine whether federal restrictions on corporate campaign contributions in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) violated the First Amendment
Speech Clause.174 In oral argument, corporate constitutional personhood was the subject of many of the Justices’ questions.175 For example, Justice Ginsburg asked “is there any distinction that Congress
could draw between corporations and natural human beings for purposes of campaign finance?” and Justice Stevens asked “does the First
Amendment permit any distinction between corporate speakers and
individual speakers?”176 Justice Sotomayor went as far as to suggest
that the Court had erred when it “imbued a creature of State law [the
corporation] with human characteristics.”177
In holding that corporations are rights holders for the purposes of
the First Amendment Speech Clause, the Court seemed to rely on the
general post-1960s approach to the question of corporate constitutional personhood, and focused on the purpose of the right, rather
than the nature of the claimant.178 The Court specified that their concern is the purpose of the right—here, protecting the rights of listeners
and the “marketplace of ideas.”179 For the Court, the identity of the
speaker was irrelevant; if the regulations encroached on the subject
protected by the right, the right was violated, no matter the identity of
the speaker.180 Justice Scalia’s concurrence took pains to point out the
textual basis for the Court’s conclusions. Justice Scalia noted that the
text of the Speech Clause “makes no distinction between types of
speakers” and that the Clause protects individuals’ right to speak “in
173 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010) (holding that corporations are
rights holders for the purpose of the First Amendment Speech Clause).
174 Id. at 331.
175 For an extended analysis of the Justices’ questioning of counsel on corporate constitutional personhood, see Miller, supra note 98, at 839–99.
176 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 7, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, (No. 08-205),
2009 WL 6325467.
177 Id. at 33.
178 Warren, supra note 111, at 1323 (“Thus, the Court’s recent jurisprudence has disregarded the express use of corporate personhood theories when deciding which bill of rights guarantees apply to corporations.”).
179 Pollman, supra note 21, at 1657; see also Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 253 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (critiquing the
“marketplace of ideas” approach); Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 863–68 (2007) (arguing that corporate personhood
has played a less prominent role in shaping corporate speech rights than some claim).
180 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 347 (2010).
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association with other individuals.”181 Justice Scalia concluded, “The
[First] Amendment is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers. Its
text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from
single individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations of individuals, to incorporated associations of individuals . . . .”182 For Justice Scalia, denying constitutional personhood to
corporations, at least for First Amendment speech purposes, would be
violative of the text of the Clause.183
The question of corporate constitutional personhood is not a historical one. Indeed, the question again came before the Court last
Term in the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby litigation.184 There, the corporate claimant argued that the protections of the First Amendment
Free Exercise Clause extended to protect the religious liberty of the
corporation.185 Although the Court in Hobby Lobby ultimately
reached a decision on statutory, not constitutional, grounds, the issue
is likely to come before the Court in the not-too-distant future. With
its highly political, deeply fraught undertones,186 the question of corporate constitutional personhood in the Free Exercise Clause highlights the importance of developing a coherent and unified theory for
understanding constitutional personhood.187
B. Aliens
Just as the constitutional rights of corporations is an open, contemporary issue, the question of the constitutional personhood of
aliens—both within and outside the United States, documented and
undocumented—is currently at the forefront of American law and
politics.188 As thousands of undocumented persons cross into the
Id. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. 392–93.
183 See Miller, supra note 98, at 899 (“According to Justice Scalia, any attempt to craft a
special category of corporate persons for core First Amendment purposes would be in clear
derogation of the text.”).
184 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
185 Id. at 2765–66.
186 See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 20; Flowers, supra note 20; Schwartzman & Tebbe, supra
note 20.
187 Cf. Miller, supra note 98, at 891 (examining the potential for corporations to claim Second Amendment protections).
188 See, e.g., Rachel Brody, Should Unaccompanied Immigrant Children Be Sent Home?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 7, 2014, 1:15 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/
2014/07/07/should-undocumented-immigrant-children-be-sent-home-from-the-border; Niraj
Chokshi, More than 30,000 Undocumented Kids Have Been Released to Sponsors in Every State,
WASH. POST (July 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/07/25/morethan-30000-undocumented-kids-have-been-released-to-sponsors-in-every-state/.
181
182
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United States from Latin America, many of them unaccompanied minors, the lower courts are increasingly being asked to determine what,
if any, rights these persons have under the U.S. Constitution.189
Just as with corporations, the question of alien constitutional personhood is fraught and unclear.190 However, the question of alien
constitutional personhood typically comes under a different guise than
that of corporate constitutional personhood.191 While the Court has
always dealt with the issue of corporate constitutional personhood expressly or implicitly as a question antecedent to the merits of the
rights-claim, the constitutional personhood of aliens is often bound up
in the question of the level of protection afforded to the alien-claimant.192 That is, with some limited exceptions, the Court has conflated
the front-end question of whether the alien is a rights holder for any
given constitutional right, with the back-end merits question of the
level of protection to be afforded to the claimant when determining
that the government’s conduct is permissible under a deferential standard of review.193
In a significant number of cases involving alien rights claims the
question is one of diluted constitutional personhood—an implicit denial of constitutional personhood for aliens through dilution of the
“protection” of the right afforded to the alien-claimant rather than the
express denial of constitutional personhood at the front-end, antecedent question stage.194 This is the same issue as in corporate constitutional personhood, but under a different guise.195 Diluting the rights
Chokshi, supra note 188.
Linda S. Bosniak, Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L.
9, 12 (2010).
191 Id.
192 Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1064, 1088–89.
193 On the value of disaggregating rights analysis, see Frederick Schauer, Categories and the
First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 265–66 (1981) (discussing the
importance of categorization in the context of the First Amendment). See generally Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004) (discussing the determinants of the boundaries of constitutional categories).
194 On rights-dilution as rights-denial, see, for example, Bosniak, supra note 190, at 14 (stating that “[p]ersonhood may not be formally withdrawn, and yet it may be diminished in its
effect, evaded, effaced, diluted, displaced” and referring to this concept as “depreciation” of
rights); Gulasekaram, supra note 96, at 626 (“The federal government can—and routinely
does—make distinctions based on citizenship.”); Laurence D. Houlgate, Three Concepts of Children’s Constitutional Rights: Reflections on the Enjoyment Theory, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 77, 82
(1999) (discussing the theory of limited scope rights for children).
195 See Houlgate, supra note 194, at 80–85 (discussing the theory of limited scope rights in
the context of children’s constitutional rights).
189
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of any person ends up giving us two (or more) sets of constitutional
rights, where the difference between the rights in each set having the
same name is a difference in their scope.196 The question is thus simply reframed: “What are the criteria for deciding whether a given class
of persons should have rights of the same or of a different scope from
persons of another group or class?”197 In other words, we end up at
the same place even though the Court has framed the question differently—the question is still one of who holds any given constitutional
right. Leading immigration scholar Linda Bosniak notes:
Personhood may not be formally withdrawn, and yet it may
be diminished in its effect, evaded, effaced, diluted, displaced. This is the real risk to constitutional personhood for
noncitizens and for some citizens, as well; not outright removal but depreciation—at times specifically imposed by
government and at others, perhaps, a function of the inherent incompleteness of the category itself.198
The difference in the treatment of the constitutional personhood
question between aliens and corporations is understandable.199 As Alexander Bickel noted, “It has always been easier, it always will be
easier, to think of someone as a noncitizen than to decide that he is a
non-person . . . .”200 It is important to recall, however, that what is at
stake in the designation as a constitutional person is not a declaration
of a person’s humanity.201 Rather, at stake is recognition of a legal
status under the Constitution. To that end, it is critical to separate the
emotive and loaded assumptions of humaneness in declarations of
constitutional personhood and instead focus on ascertaining the status
as a rights holder.202 The following paragraphs attempt to highlight
the Court’s assumptions of constitutional personhood that are entrenched in the balancing analysis for this purpose.203
Id.
Id. at 82.
198 Bosniak, supra note 190, at 14.
199 Id. at 11–12.
200 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 53 (1975); see also Bosniak,
supra note 190, at 9–10 (discussing citizenship and personhood); Michael Scaperlanda, Partial
Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707, 712–13 (1996)
(distinguishing between membership and personhood).
201 See Rivard, supra note 19, at 1446–47 (“[A] constitutional person is one who is protected by the Constitution of the United States; in other words, a constitutional person is one
who is granted constitutional rights.”); Scaperlanda, supra note 200, at 713 n.16 (citing Supreme
Court cases) (“Personhood denotes constitutional status. Persons have constitutional rights,
nonpersons do not.”).
202 See Rivard, supra note 19, at 1447.
203 For an excellent and exhaustive summary and analysis of the constitutional status of
196
197
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With that said, perhaps the best starting point for analyzing the
alien constitutional personhood jurisprudence is with the case that
uses a form of analysis familiar from corporate constitutional personhood. In Johnson v. Eisentrager,204 the Court was faced with the
question whether German citizens, captured by the United States in
China aiding and abetting the Japanese war effort against the United
States, and who remained on Chinese soil (albeit in U.S. custody),
were entitled to Fifth Amendment rights in their criminal proceedings.205 The Supreme Court held that extraterritorial, nonresident
aliens were not “persons” for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.206
The Court specifically stated that the claimants were not Fifth
Amendment rights holders because they had both no territorial connection to the United States (i.e., the crime and trial occurred outside
of the territory of the United States) and the claimants were “alien
enemies.”207
Importantly, the Court in Eisentrager highlighted that it was not
necessarily a consequence of the alienage classification that resulted in
the denial of personhood.208 Instead, the Court held that it was the
combination of alienage status and enemy status during a time of war
that led to the denial of the capacity to claim the right in question.209
The Court stated that the “disabilities this country lays upon the alien
who becomes also an enemy are imposed temporarily as an incident of
war and not as an incident of alienage.”210 In addition, the Court
noted that aliens are “accorded a generous and ascending scale of
rights as [they] increase[ ] [their] identity with [American] society,” a
scale that is based in part on the “alien’s presence within [the] territorial jurisdiction [of the United States].”211
Similarly, the Court has used the familiar front-end mode of analysis in the criminal procedure rights context, and imposed limits on
the relevant class of rights holders based on a conception of memberaliens, see generally Moore, supra note 43 (discussing the concept alienage, before comprehensively examining the constitutional rights of aliens).
204 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). On the case, see Cole, supra note 21, at
369 (“While some distinctions between foreign nationals and citizens are normatively justified
and consistent with constitutional and international law, most are not.”); Moore, supra note 43,
at 826–30.
205 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765–67.
206 See id. at 784; Moore, supra note 43, at 826.
207 Moore, supra note 43, at 826.
208 See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 772.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 770–71.
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ship in the political community.212 In the leading 1990 case of United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,213 the Court was asked to address the applicability of the Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause to
aliens.214 Writing for a plurality, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
the rights holder designation “the people” in the Fourth Amendment
was distinct from the Fifth Amendment’s designation of the rights
holder as a “person,” a designation that the Court had previously held
attached to aliens.215 The Chief Justice held that the Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the people” “refers to a class of persons who are
part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.”216
The Court’s proclamation in Verdugo-Urquidez that “the people”
excludes those who are not part of the American national community
necessarily raises related questions in the context of other rights.217
Core among these is the right of “the people” to bear arms under the
Second Amendment.218 As Pratheepan Gulasekaram notes, in the
Court’s seminal Second Amendment decision in District of Columbia
v. Heller,219 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion interprets the nominal
right-holder as a specific class of “law-abiding citizens,”220 and specified that “the people” is limited to “members of the political commu212 On community membership and alienage, see Bosniak, supra note 190, at 1055; Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the United
States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367, 392 (2013); Gerald L. Neuman, “We Are the People”:
Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259, 261 (1992); see
also Gulasekaram, supra note 96, at 622; Gulasekaram, supra note 52, at 1546 (stating, in the
context of the right to bear arms, that “Pre-Revolutionary War gun regulation did not necessarily depend on categories of legal citizenship but rather on a conception of membership in the
national community contingent upon race, wealth, and gender.”).
213 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). On the decision in
Verdugo-Urquidez, see NEUMAN, supra note 36, at 105 (“Kennedy’s concurring opinion diverged
so greatly from Rehnquist’s analysis and conclusions that Rehnquist seemed really to be speaking for a plurality of four.”); Moore, supra note 43, at 835; see also Heeren, supra note 212, at
389–90 (“For the first time, the Court seemed to be saying that the Fourth Amendment, long
considered a basic right of personhood, was a membership right, restricted to persons with ‘sufficient connection’ to the United States. . . . Verdugo-Urquidez and Dred Scott both use communitarian logic to limit the rights of putative outsiders.”).
214 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261.
215 See id. at 265–66; Moore, supra note 43, at 825.
216 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265–66.
217 See Gulasekaram, supra note 52, at 1527–35.
218 See id. at 1527.
219 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). For detailed discussion of this claim
and associated arguments, see Gulasekaram, supra note 52; Gulasekaram, supra note 96.
220 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, 635.
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nity.”221 In a carefully reasoned article, Gulasekaram outlines the
ramifications of both Heller and Verdugo-Urquidez for the Second
Amendment rights of non-citizens.222 Gulasekaram claims that Heller’s reading of “the people” invites the question “whether the Constitution compels reading ‘the people’ of the Second Amendment to
mean ‘citizens.’”223
In the face of these denials of alien constitutional personhood follow a number of cases where the Court has accepted that the alienclaimant falls within the meaning of the term “person” or “people” for
the purpose of the right whose protection was being claimed. For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,224 the Court was faced with a challenge
to a California ordinance regulating laundry facilities.225 The petitioner’s claim was that the ordinance was applied unequally because it
was only enforced against Chinese immigrants, violating the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.226 Citing the Equal Protection Clause, the Court stated that “[t]hese provisions are universal
in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality;
and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws.”227 The Court struck down the Ordinance, holding that
despite being “fair on its face,” it was applied unequally, and therefore
violated the Equal Protection Clause.228 As a general matter, after
Yick Wo, the Court has consistently applied the Equal Protection
Clause to classifications based on alienage and held that the appropriate standard of review is strict scrutiny.229
The Court has also held that aliens are rights holders for the purposes of constitutional rights outside of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 580.
See Gulasekaram, supra note 52.
223 Id. at 1532–33; see also U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People”); id. art. I, § 2 (“The House
of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of
the several States”); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(explaining distinction between “person” and “citizen”); Henkin, supra note 52, at 13; Miller,
supra note 98; Moore, supra note 43, at 843–44.
224 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
225 See id. at 366.
226 Id. at 368; see also Moore, supra note 43, at 811 (discussing the case).
227 Yick Wo, 188 U.S. at 369.
228 Id. at 373–74; see also Moore, supra note 43, at 811.
229 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971); Moore, supra note 43, at 811.
However, the Court has established exceptions. See Moore, supra note 43, at 812–14 (outlining
and discussing exceptions based on alienage to the protections afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
221
222
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In Wong Wing v. United States,230 for example, the alien-petitioner
claimed that a statute that required aliens who were unlawfully present in the United States to be “imprisoned at hard labor for a period
not exceeding one year”231 violated provisions of both the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.232 Relying on the authority of Yick Wo, the Court
agreed, stating without further explanation that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments applied to “all persons within the territory of the United
States . . . even aliens . . . .”233 In addition, the Court has recognized
that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes, in the case of alien defendants, “the right to be informed of the
immigration-related consequences of entering a guilty plea.”234 Generally speaking, it is assumed that aliens are on the same constitutional footing as other persons—at least inasmuch as the rights are not
limited to the citizen rights holder.235
Yet, in the face of this assumption the Court does differentiate
between categories of persons: between both alien and citizen and between different classes of aliens (e.g., between non-resident aliens and
illegal aliens).236 As noted above, this differentiation occurs at the
back end of the right analysis when the Court dilutes the level of protection afforded to the alien constitutional person as compared to
other constitutional persons.237 A key example of this is the “public
230

Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).

Id. at 233–34; see also Heeren, supra note 212, at 388 (discussing the case); Moore, supra
note 43, at 825 (same).
232 Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 234.
233 Id. at 238.
234 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482–83 (2010) (“The weight of prevailing
professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of
deportation.”); see also Moore, supra note 43, at 825–26 (citing Scott C. Gyllenborg, Effective
Assistance of Counsel to an Alien Criminal Defendant under the Sixth Amendment after Padilla v.
Kentucky, 79 UMKC L. REV. 925 (2011)). But see Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103,
1105 (2013) (holding that the rule announced in Padilla does not apply retroactively).
235 See Moore, supra note 43, at 825 (“Today, an alien’s right to the full panoply of constitutional criminal-trial protections is essentially beyond dispute, despite the fact that the Supreme
Court has not explicitly held that aliens are entitled to each of the specific underlying
rights . . . .”); see also Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law—
The International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators
From Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 874 (2003) (“When an alien defendant is on
trial in a federal courtroom in the United States, no one would dispute the fact that he is afforded the right to an attorney, the right to call witnesses in his defense[,] and all of the other
constitutional rights that are synonymous in this country with the right to a fair trial.”).

R
R

236 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 43, at 806–10 (discussing the differences between various
classes of alienage, and between citizen and alien). See generally Bosniak, supra note 190 (discussing polity membership in the context of alienage and personhood).
237 See supra notes 188–211 and accompanying text.
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functions” exception to alienage discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.238 The Court has consistently held that where the state
discriminates against aliens for the purpose of excluding them from
participation in governmental or political activities or functions, the
lowest level of scrutiny is applied: rational basis review.239 The notion
of “public functions” reaches beyond the purely political realm, extending to exclusion of alien employment as teachers in public
schools,240 as peace officers,241 and as state police officers.242
The Court’s justification for the modified equal protection right
for aliens in the context of “public functions” centers on notions of
who has the right to participate in government in the political community.243 In essence, the Court has implicitly held that aliens are excludable from the political community, and that the state, in discriminating
on the basis of alienage, is simply “defin[ing] its political community.”244 For this reason, the Court has held that it will be extremely
deferential to laws that “exclude aliens from positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.”245 For the Court,
“a [s]tate’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its
democratic political institutions [is] part of the sovereign’s obligation
‘to preserve the basic conception of a political community’ ”246 and a
238 This point is made by Moore, supra note 43, at 812–13 (examining the “public function”
exception). See also Scaperlanda, supra note 200, at 736–38 (discussing the “public functions”
exception).
239 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220–22 (1984) (“[T]he ‘public function’ exception . . .
applies to laws that exclude aliens from positions intimately related to the process of democratic
self-government.”). For an excellent overview of the caselaw on the public functions exception,
see, for example, Moore, supra note 43, at 812–13; Scaperlanda, supra note 200, at 736–37 (analyzing the public function exception in the context of membership in the democratic community); Tamra M. Boyd, Note, Keeping the Constitution’s Promise: An Argument for Greater
Judicial Scrutiny of Federal Alienage Classifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 319, 337 (2001).
240 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75–76 (1979) (“Public education, like the police function, ‘fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.’ ”).
241 Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 447 (1982) (“[F]rom the perspective of the larger
community, the probation officer may symbolize the political community’s control over, and
thus responsibility for, those who have been found to have violated the norms of social order.”).
242 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978) (upholding a New York statute limiting
police force to citizens because “the police function is essentially a description of one of the basic
functions of government”).
243 See Boyd, supra note 239, at 337; Heeren, supra note 212, at 387.
244 See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642–43 (1973); Scaperlanda, supra note 200, at
736–37.
245 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984); see Scaperlanda, supra note 200, at 737.
246 Foley, 435 U.S. at 295–96 (citation omitted); Gerald L. Neuman, “We are the People”:
Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259, 311–12 (1992); see
also Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1092, 1093, 1135–36 (1977).
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“necessary consequence of the community’s process of political selfdefinition.”247
C. Felons
The final class of claimants that this Article will examine is
felons.248 As a class, felons present interesting questions of interpretation. Whereas the questions in the corporations and alienage categories were when and under what conditions these persons would be
granted constitutional personhood, generally, in the case of felons, the
claimants had previously held the right in question but by virtue of
being, or having been, incarcerated they have been stripped of constitutional protections.249 Felons, then, present the questions of when
and under what conditions an existing constitutional person will be
stripped of constitutional personhood.250
Of all of the rights that felons forfeit, the most significant legal
right that felons forfeit is the loss of the right to vote.251 The right to
vote is not expressly guaranteed in the Constitution; the original Constitution left it to each state to determine voter qualifications.252 However, in the wake of the Civil War, a series of constitutional
amendments were passed limiting the states from excluding persons
from voting based on a variety of statuses, including citizenship, race,
sex, age, and poll tax.253 Contemporary understandings of the right to
vote, then, is that it at least extends to all “citizens”; that is, the designated rights holder of the right to vote is a “citizen” of the United
States.254 Yet, in the face of this general assumption that all citizens
have the constitutional right to vote, persons convicted of a felony are
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982).
The term “felon” includes prisoners, parolees, and probationers. See Alec C. Ewald,
“Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States,
2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1054 n.23 (discussing the variety of state laws on the disenfranchisement
of prisoners, parolees, and probationers). See generally Emily Calhoun, The Supreme Court and
the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219 (1977).
249 Ewald, supra note 248, at 1046.
250 Calhoun, supra note 248, at 219–20.
251 See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3 (2006); Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and the Disappearing Voters, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT 50, 51–52 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
252 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 251, at 7.
253 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (guarantee of voting rights); id. amend. XV (race no bar to
vote); id. amend. XIX (women’s suffrage); id. amend. XXIV (no poll tax); id. amend. XXVI
(extending voting rights to citizens over eighteen).
254 See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 251, at 163.
247
248
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regularly disenfranchised (i.e., denied the right to vote),255 with some
states currently disenfranchising close to ten percent of their voting
populations on the basis of prior felony convictions.256
Felon disenfranchisement has a long history.257 It finds its roots
in the English concept of “civil death,” which the colonists imported
to North America.258 As a concept, civil death is broader than disenfranchisement, encompassing prohibitions on a broad array of civil
rights, including the right to sue, as well as the right to vote.259 There
was a resurgence in felon disenfranchisement laws following the Civil
War and, by 1869, some twenty-nine states had enacted laws disenfranchising persons convicted of felonies, with many of the laws mandating a permanent disenfranchisement (i.e., not limited to while
serving time).260 Many scholars have carefully noted the link between
the post-Civil War rise in felon disenfranchisement laws and the rise
of black involvement in politics during the Reconstruction period.261
Alec Ewald notes that “[a]fter Reconstruction, several Southern states
carefully re-wrote their criminal disenfranchisement provisions with
the express intent of excluding blacks from the suffrage.”262 The Sentencing Project’s study of felon disenfranchisement claims that these
states expressly tailored their disenfranchisement laws to capture
those crimes that they believed were most frequently committed by
blacks.263 Alabama’s disenfranchisement provision, for example, exId.
See JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER, (2014) 1–2, 4, http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_Felony%20Disenfran
chisement%20Primer.pdf (discussing the various state restrictions on voting rights).
257 See Ewald, supra note 248, at 1059–72.
258 Id. at 1060–61 (describing the English concept of civil death).
259 See id. at 1059–61; Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender’s Right to Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 724 (1973).
260 See CHUNG, supra note 256, at 3, 5 (outlining in brief the history of felon disenfranchisement laws); Ewald, supra note 248 at 1065–66.
261 See Ewald, supra note 248, at 1047–48 (noting that scholars have discussed the racial
dimension of felon disenfranchisement); George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment:
Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1900–01 (1999); Virginia E.
Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 727, 733–43 (1998).
262 Ewald, supra note 248 at 1065; see also CHUNG, supra note 256, at 3 (“In the postReconstruction period, several Southern states tailored their disenfranchisement laws in order to
bar black male voters . . . .”).
263 See CHUNG, supra note 256, at 3; see also PAUL LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS, & PARTY: A
HISTORY OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE AND WHITE POLITICS IN THE SOUTH 85–86 (1963); Andrew L.
Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New
Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 540–42 (1993) (providing examples of crimes considered more likely
to be committed by blacks than whites).
255
256
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cluded men charged with spousal abuse, the author of the law estimating that “the crime of wife-beating alone would disqualify sixty
percent of the Negroes.”264 Indeed, in Alabama, spousal abuse would
have resulted in disenfranchisement, but murder would not.265
Across the United States, there is diversity in the scope of felon
disenfranchisement. In twelve states, even after a felon has completed
her prison sentence, any parole, and her probation period, she remains completely disenfranchised.266 In another nineteen states, a
felon remains disenfranchised during the term of prison, parole, and
probation.267 In fact, only two states do not restrict the voting rights of
felon-citizens at all (i.e., both while in prison or after release): Maine
and Vermont.268 In the face of these restrictions, a number of challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws have ensued. One scholar
notes, “[t]here are so many constitutional arguments against the disenfranchisement of felons that one can only wonder at the survival of
the practice.”269
However, in its 1974 decision of Richardson v. Ramirez,270 the
Court held that there was no constitutional impediment to states limiting the voting rights of felon-citizens.271 In Richardson, three men
Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 616 (11th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
See CHUNG, supra note 256, at 3.
266 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING THE VOTE: THE
IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES. (2014) [hereinafter
LOSING THE VOTE], http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/file/fvr/fd_losingthevote.pdf; see also
CHUNG, supra note 256, at 2.
267 See CHUNG, supra note 256, at 2; LOSING THE VOTE, supra note 266, at 5.
268 The states that maintain restrictions on voting for post-release convicted felons not on
probation are Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, and Virginia. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (2002);
FLA. STAT. § 97.041(2)(b) (2001); see also Fact Sheet: Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the
United States, THESENTENCINGPROJECT.ORG Apr. 2014, at 4, http://sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/fd_Felony%20Disenfranchisement%20Laws%20in%20the%20US.pdf (outlining
each states’ approach to felon voting rights).
269 Fletcher, supra note 261, at 1903; accord Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts:
Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1147, 1150 (2004); see also MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 251, at 21 (claiming a “national guarantee of the right to vote has essentially developed” through Constitutional Amendments and Supreme Court decisions). Contra Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal
Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1584 (2012)
(claiming felon disenfranchisement is constitutionally protected); Mary Sigler, Defensible Disenfranchisement, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1725, 1727 (2014) (purporting to develop a version of felon
disenfranchisement that is symbiotic with a modern liberal democracy).
270 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
271 See id. at 54; Ewald, supra note 248, at 1066–72; Re & Re, supra note 269, at 1642–48;
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2 (stating that state representation may be reduced if the
state denies voting rights to adult male citizens “except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97 (1958) (explaining that felon disenfranchisement is a
264
265
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sued the state of California, arguing that the state statute on felon
voting rights violated the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause.272 The Constitution, the claimants argued,
guarantees a right to citizens to vote, and the California law denying
that right was an equal protection violation—the state was treating
two groups of citizens differently.273
The Court disagreed, overturning the lower court’s decision striking down California’s permanent felon-disenfranchisement law.274 In
reaching its decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion of
drew on Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a clause, according
to Alec Ewald, that most scholars had, until that point, referred to as
“obsolete.”275 Section 2 outlines that any state that engages in the disenfranchisement of citizens will face a proportionate reduction in representatives in Congress, and with an exception for “participation in
rebellion, or other crime.”276 The Court claimed that the express
terms of Section 2 permitted states to ban felons from voting, therefore the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause “could not
have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement that
was expressly” permitted in the subsequent provision.277 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court relied on the text of the Constitution, legislative history, and the broader historic context.278 The Court argued
that the text of Section 2 clearly permits states to limit the voting
rights of those citizens who have committed a crime, and that the legislative history “indicates that this language was intended by Congress
to mean what it says.”279 The Court also considered the historic prac“nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise” and a way to “designate a reasonable
ground of eligibility for voting”).
272 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 26–27.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 56.
275 See Ewald, supra note 248, at 1068 n.90; see also Richardson, 418 U.S. at 41–42.
276 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Richardson, 418 U.S. at 42.
277 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 55; see also CHUNG, supra note 256, at 3; Ewald, supra note 248,
at 1068.
278 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43.
279 Id. Note that although the Richardson Court failed to engage in any theoretical analysis
of why it is constitutionally acceptable to disenfranchise felons, other courts have considered the
underlying justification. See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d
Cir. 1967) (invoking social contract theory and stating that “[a] man who breaks the laws . . .
could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right to participate in further administering the compact”); Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884) (upholding felon disenfranchisement on the ground that “one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense
indicative of great moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage”). See generally
Ewald, supra note 248.
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tice in the states, noting that twenty-nine states had provisions that
limited the voting rights of felon-citizens at the time of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment.280
While the Court’s denial of voting rights to a previously recognized constitutional person in Richardson is the most prominent example of denial of constitutional personhood for felons, it is not the
only one.281 Similar to the dilution of alien constitutional rights in the
balancing analysis discussed above, in a variety of contexts felons are
denied constitutional personhood through the dilution of the protection afforded to the claimed constitutional right.282 In a recent empirical study on the rights of parolees, Tonja Jacobi, Song Richardson, and
Gregory Barr comprehensively demonstrate how there exists a “significant yet unappreciated attrition of constitutional rights.”283
A core example highlighted by Jacobi, Richardson, and Barr of
diluted constitutional personhood for parolees is in the context of the
Fourth Amendment right granted to “the people” to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures without probable cause and other
warrant requirements.284 While safeguards exist to prevent against
suspicionless searches of the ordinary citizen, in the context of felonparolees the Court has held that persons on parole have lowered expectations of privacy, and searches and seizures without the usual requirements are permissible.285 That is, both warrantless searches, and
searches without the usual probable cause safeguards are permitted in
the case of a parolee.286 The Court has specified that, “by virtue of
their status alone” persons falling into one of these classes “do not
enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.”287 Instead, these persons “have diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone.”288 The practical import of this diminished
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 48.
See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (recognizing that legislatures
may constitutionally prohibit a convicted felon from engaging in a range of fundamental activities, including possession of a firearm).
282 See, e.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (upholding prohibition against felons
holding office in a waterfront labor organization); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (upholding
prohibition against felons engaging in the practice of medicine).
283 Tonja Jacobi et al., The Attrition of Rights Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 887, 890
(2014).
284 Id. at 905–11.
285 Id. at 906 (“[I]n Samson v. California, the Supreme Court deemed parolees to have such
a diminished expectation of privacy that even suspicionless searches can be authorized.”); see
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006).
286 Samson, 547 U.S. at 847.
287 Id. at 848–49 (citations omitted); see Jacobi et al., supra note 283, at 906.
288 Samson, 547 U.S. at 852; see Jacobi et al., supra note 283, at 906.
280
281
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privacy right is that persons like felon-parolees are subject to a suspicionless search at any time, should the state choose to do so.289
Interestingly, in the series of cases establishing that felons have
diluted privacy rights, the Court does not refer to the textually designated rights holder, namely “the people.”290 Instead, the Court uses
“citizens” as its comparator category that enjoys the full protections of
the Fourth Amendment privacy right.291 Further, in its analysis of why
the Fourth Amendment privacy right of prisoners, parolees, and probationers is diluted, the Court relies on the fact that the state’s interest
in punishment, and relatedly parole and to some extent, probation, is
at least to “reduc[e] recidivism, [and] thereby promot[e] reintegration
and positive citizenship . . . .”292
In Samson v. California,293 for example, the Court spent some significant time reciting the empirical evidence supporting the state’s
claim that suspicionless searches were essential to aid the state interest of reduction in recidivism.294 The Court quoted a variety of statistics on the recidivism rate of parolees and stated, “California’s ability
to conduct suspicionless searches of parolees serves its interest in reducing recidivism, in a manner that aids, rather than hinders, the reintegration of parolees into productive society.”295 It seems, then, that
for determining the constitutional personhood of felons, the Court
strongly considers the state’s interest in violating the otherwise textually available constitutional right.296 Implicitly underlying the Court’s
permissiveness of state restrictions on rights of prisoners seems to be
an assumption that, by committing a crime, these citizens have proved
themselves to be unworthy of equal citizenship and rights.297
Samson, 547 U.S. at 852; see Jacobi et al., supra note 283, at 906.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (emphasis
added)).
291 Samson, 547 U.S. at 849.
292 Id. at 853; see Jacobi et al., supra note 283, at 907–08 (discussing the underlying rationale of the Court’s decision in Samson).
293 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006) (“The extent and reach of [parole] conditions demonstrate that parolees . . . have severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of
their status alone.”).
294 Id. at 854.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 843.
297 See AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 30 (2014); Jacobi et al., supra note 283,
at 892.
289
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The aim of this Part has been to analyze the Court’s methodology
and doctrinal justifications for granting or denying constitutional personhood across a range of claimants and panoply of rights. The three
case studies show that the Court has vacillated in its approach when
determining the personhood of litigants.298 More broadly, taken together, the case studies demonstrate that the Court has failed to consider constitutional personhood in the aggregate, as a question for
which a unified theory and approach should be developed. This Article repudiates this individualistic, disaggregated precedential tradition. Part III explains why, before Part IV turns to begin to develop
an aggregate theory and approach to questions of constitutional
personhood.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY

AND

This Part is concerned with identifying the fundamental trouble
with the Court’s opaque and disaggregated approach to constitutional
personhood. At its core, the Court’s constitutional personhood jurisprudence presents a worrying narrative of majoritarianism, whereby
the decision to grant or deny personhood privileges dominant classes
and harms subordinate and vulnerable groups. That is, the constitutional personhood jurisprudence roughly mirrors contemporary public
opinion, the views of the political branches, and the positions held by
powerful social institutions (e.g., corporations).299 While a rich body
of scholarship across a range of traditions—from scholars including
constitutional theorists, political scientists, and critical legal theorists—has described the majoritarian tendencies of the Court,300 this
See supra Part II.A–C and accompanying notes.
See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 192
(1989) (“Overall, the evidence suggests that the modern Court has been an essentially
majoritarian institution.”); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 424 (2002) (“Supreme Court decisions by and large
correspond with public opinion.”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQUALITY 1, 1–4 (2005)
(claiming that the Supreme Court is a majoritarian, rather than a countermajoritarian, institution); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian
Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
87, 97 (1993) (“Our analyses indicate that for most of the period since 1956, the Court has been
highly responsive to majority opinion.”); Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Popular Influence
on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711, 711 (1994) (“[N]umerous scholars have
found that the Court is not generally out of line with public opinion.”).
300 See Hutchinson, supra note 299, at 2, 20 (quoting David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 247–49 (1984)) (“arguing that the ‘results’ in legal contests ‘come from
those same political, social, moral, and religious value judgments from which the law purports to
298
299
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Part demonstrates that these majoritarian concerns are heightened in
the context of constitutional personhood.
At the outset, it is important to recall what the constitutional personhood inquiry entails. As an inquiry analytically antecedent to any
consideration of the merits of the rights-claim, constitutional personhood acts as the metaphoric gate through which a litigant must
pass before her claim of governmental transgression will be considered by the courts.301 As described in Part I, constitutional personhood asks whether the litigant is in fact entitled to challenge the
alleged governmental violation of an individual constitutional entitlement.302 The question of a litigant’s entitlement to claim the protection of any given constitutional right is a necessary predicate to any
judicial consideration of the merits of that claim.303 Without vested
personhood, the claimant has no entitlement to the substantive protections of the right.304
Stepping back from the technicalities of the personhood inquiry,
at the theoretical level constitutional personhood represents membership in the constitutional polity.305 In this way, constitutional personhood decisions reflect judgments as to the boundaries of the
constitutional community.306 On this view, a claim to be a constitutional person is a claim that the litigant is entitled to call on the constitutional compact.307 When undertaking constitutional personhood
determinations, then, the Court is determining who is eligible to call
on the contract.308 While in a limited sense, designation as a constitube independent’ ”)); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1984) (“Those of us associated with Critical Legal Studies believe that law
is not apolitical and objective: Lawyers, judges, and scholars make highly controversial political
choices, but use the ideology of legal reasoning to make our institutions appear natural and our
rules appear neutral.”); see also Samson, 547 U.S. at 853–55.
301 See supra notes 49–76 and accompanying text.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 See NEUMAN, supra note 36, at 3 (“Eligibility to participate in constitutional discourse
confers an opportunity to influence the shaping of the framework for government action.”);
Cleveland, supra note 36, at 20–22 (discussing the scope of the Constitution’s application).
306 See Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1086–89 (pointing out controversies in boundaries of the
membership sphere); Pildes, supra note 25, at 734 (“ ‘[R]ights’ are best understood as the way
constitutional law marks the boundaries between different spheres of political authority.”).
307 See Rivard, supra note 19, at 1446–47 (“[A] threshold question for determining whether
one is entitled to constitutional rights is whether one is a constitutional person.”).
308 On social contract theory, and the Constitution as contract, see, for example, THOMAS
HOBBES, HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN 128–32 (Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1651); JOHN LOCKE,
LOCKE’S SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 47–55 (Lester DeKoster ed., William B.
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tional person is simply reflective of a legal status under the Constitution—that is, indicative of the legal rights that the rights holder is
entitled to—in a broader sense, recognition or non-recognition as a
constitutional person is reflective of the Court’s normative assumptions about who belongs in the constitutional community.309 That is,
the inclusion or exclusion of certain persons from the protection of
certain constitutional rights is intimately linked to that person’s membership status in the broader polity.310
On a conventional academic account, no concern would be raised
by this description of constitutional personhood or the Court’s role in
these determinations.311 As Darren Hutchinson notes, “[c]onventional academic literature portrays the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian body.”312 The Court is traditionally viewed as the institutional enforcer of rights and the bulwark against governmental
transgressions on individual rights.313 The various justifications for the
Eerdmans Publ’g Co. 1978) (1689); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17–22 (1971); JEANJACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract, in BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 141, 141–53 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publ’g 1987) (1762).
309 See GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 54–56 (1992) (explaining that choosing a strict intentionalist approach to constitutional theory will better affirm originalist values of stability, clarity and certainty, while a
moderate intentionalist approach will authorize judges to use their own political judgment, but
will also accommodate political decisions like Brown v. Board of Education); Roger P. Alford,
In Search for a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 708–11 (2005)
(explaining that a judge’s use of comparative constitutional methodology will depend on the
constitutional theory grounding the judge’s decisionmaking, and that the constitutional theory a
judge uses will aspire to promote political democracy and to advance substantive justice by respecting individual rights); Bosniak, supra note 27, at 1053 (discussing community membership
in the context of alienage and noting that “the exclusion of aliens from access to various rights
and benefits in this society properly preserves the benefits of membership for those deemed to
belong within the moral boundaries of the national community”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to
Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 549–52 (1999) (a constitutional theory
should advance the goals of maintaining the rule of law, preserving a fair opportunity for majority rule in political democracy, and promoting substantive justice by protecting individual rights);
Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitutional Theory
Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1845–46 (1997) (explaining that a constitutional theory must address how undebatable ideas change into debatable ones, and debatable ideas change into undebatable ones).
310 Id.
311 See Pildes, supra note 25, at 2.
312 Hutchinson, supra note 299, at 1.
313 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–59 (1980) (justifying judicial review on the grounds that it ensures the protection of
vulnerable minorities from majoritarian abuse); Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 380
(2008); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1, 1–2 (1996) (arguing that the perception of Supreme Court as protector of “minority
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Court as the institutional locus for rights-protection revolve around
the need for a static, independent, and countermajoritarian overseer
to preserve the rights of individuals against abridgement by transient
popular majorities.314 This institutional role is necessary, supporters
claim, in order to curtail the political and legal power of the democratic institutions.315
However, a robust body of scholarship has emerged to challenge
this traditional characterization of the Court as the defender of unpopular minorities.316 With its roots in political science and legal realism, this counter-narrative claims that neither the historic nor the
contemporary Supreme Court functions as a countermajoritarian institution.317 Instead, the claim is that the Court is in fact a
majoritarian institution. Conducting an empirical study of Supreme
Court decisions in 1957, political scientist Robert Dahl argued, “the
policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with
the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the
United States.”318 Building on Dahl’s work, political scientists have
continued to explore the extent to which larger political forces keep
the Court tethered to the mainstream viewpoint.319 In addition, constitutional and critical legal theorists have explored swathes of constitutional doctrine, claiming that “far from being a countermajoritarian
institution, the Supreme Court functions to enforce and enshrine

rights from majoritarian overreaching” is one that “exercises a powerful hold over our constitutional discourse”); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010
SUP. CT. REV. 103, 105; Andrei Marmor, Randomized Judicial Review 2 (USC Gould Ctr. L. &
Soc. Sci. Legal Stud. Res. Papers Series 15-8, 2015) (noting “constitutional judicial review is
needed as a countermeasure to ordinary democratic procedures as a limit on majority rule).
314

See ELY, supra note 313, at 135–37.

315

Id.

R

316

See infra notes 318–20.

R

317

See supra note 313; see also Hutchinson, supra note 299, at 20.

R

318 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285, 291, 293 (1957) (for Dahl, the Court is “inevitably a part of
the dominant national alliance” because “it would appear, on political grounds, somewhat unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion of Supreme Court
[J]ustices would long hold to norms of Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the
political elite”).

See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 157 (1998); GERN. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 9
(Benjamin I. Page ed., 2d ed. 2008); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 299.
319
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majoritarian views.”320 Decisions of the Court, these scholars claim,
reflect the preferences and views of America’s popular majority.321
This counter narrative represents deep and intractable concerns
for constitutional personhood.322 Because if the Court’s constitutional
personhood jurisprudence is tied to contemporary political norms and
identity status within the polity, this adds a significant wrinkle to the
conception of rights as individual protections against majoritarian excess and to the Court’s traditional position as a bulwark against
majoritarian interests.323 If the Court is calibrating those litigants entitled to claim rights protections based on a conception of the common
good—i.e., tying constitutional personhood to majoritarian status—
the Court is necessarily building into its analysis the opposite result.324
That is, the presentation of the Court as the protector of rights as
against a transient majority becomes complicated when the Court’s
grant or denial of personhood itself reflects majoritarian interests.325
Other scholars have noted this trend in claimant-specific contexts; one
scholar suggests that the Court “does not speak for everyone, but for a
political faction trying to constitute itself as a unit of many disparate
voices; its power lasts only as long as the contradictory voices remain
silenced.”326 Another scholar posits that, “redefining and constricting
‘the people,’ . . . has long been one of the tools employed by empow320 Pildes, supra note 313, at 105; see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1200 (1987); Barry Friedman, Dialogue
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 609 (1993); Hutchinson, supra note 299, at 19–22
(discussing the contributions of critical race theorists to the literature rebutting the “countermajoritarian difficulty”).
321 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L.
REV. 343, 374–75 (1993); Pildes, supra note 320, at 105; see also Roger P. Alford, In Search of a
Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 674–75 (2005); Richard
Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1081–82, 1148–49 (2013); cf.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1978); ELY, supra note 313 at 136.
See generally Hutchinson, supra note 299.
322

See Pildes, supra note 320, at 116–17.

R

R

R

R
R
R

See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting)
(“[O]f the cases in this Court in which the Fourteenth Amendment was applied during the first
fifty years after its adoption, less than one-half of one per cent[ ] invoked it in protection of the
negro race, and more than fifty per cent[ ] asked that its benefits be extended to corporations.”);
JOSEPH RAZ, Rights and Individual Well-Being, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN
THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 29 (1994).
323

324

See Pildes, supra note 25, at 734.

325

See id. at 735.

326 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 582–83 (1990).
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ered elites to ostracize nonwhite, nonmales from the Constitution’s
largesse.”327
While a detailed empirical analysis of the Court’s personhood jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article, a cursory glance at the
case studies in Part II suggests that constitutional personhood is reflective of community norms.328 For example, as outlined above, felon
disenfranchisement has historically reflected the racial attitudes of the
majority of the community. As Alec Ewald notes, while the combination of the Fifteenth Amendment and military Reconstruction “forced
Southern states to permit blacks to vote,” white southerners employed
various schemes to strip blacks of the newly acquired voting rights.329
Prominent amongst these schemes were racially motivated changes to
laws disenfranchising criminals.330 Including so-called “black crimes”
as worthy of disenfranchisement, the president of the 1901 Alabama
constitutional convention stated, “[t]his plan of popular suffrage will
eliminate the darkey as a political factor in this State in less than five
years.”331 While subsequent years saw a slow shift in racial attitudes,
making these kinds of overt statements both unpalatable and unconstitutional,332 social scientists and legal scholars continue to claim that
the legislative perpetuation of felon disenfranchisement is a consequence of race, and consequently status, within the polity.333 Pam
Karlan argues that “because electoral districts are . . . based on population, people in prison serve as essentially inert ballast . . . [and] enable the underpopulation of rural, overwhelmingly white
districts . . . .”334 At the same time, Karlan notes, the extension of

327

Gulasekaram, supra note 52, at 1537.

R

328

See What We Talk About, supra note 19, at 1762.

R

See Ewald, supra note 248, at 1065, 1090–95 (outlining the racialized history of felon
disenfranchisement); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY
SOUTH, 1880-1910, 39 (1974); JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 189 (Rev. ed. 1998).

R

See generally KOUSSER, supra note 329; MORONE, supra note 329; Ewald, supra note

R
R

329

330

248.
331 JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE
ALABAMA, May 21, 1901, at 8 (1940); see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229
(1985); Karlan, supra note 269, at 1154–55.
OF

332

See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.

333

See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 187, at 1161–63.

334

Id. at 1160 (footnote omitted).
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felon disenfranchisement beyond the prison walls can “distort the
composition of electoral districts” in favor of the white majority.335
Majoritarian trends can also be seen in the Court’s disparate
treatment across and between claimants in interest balancing. Here,
the Court appears to tradeoff the personhood of the litigant against
the state’s interest in continuing the conduct the claimant alleges is
constitutionally prohibited.336 That is, the Court is balancing the common good against the individual claim to constitutional personhood.337
While the Court frequently engages in interest balancing in rights, in
the context of claimants at the fringe of the polity, for example, felons
and aliens, the Court’s balancing represents a dilution of protection
vis-à-vis other constitutional claimants. The best example is the diluted criminal procedure protections of parolee-felons.338 Recall Samson v. California, where the Court held that felons have a diminished
expectation of privacy.339 The Court rationalized the dilution of felon
rights by reference to the interests of the community as a whole,
namely reducing recidivism in order to reintegrate felons as fully functioning and law-abiding members of society.340
All this is to say that regardless of the conception of the Court—
either as an institution providing a countermajoritarian balance, or,
instead, majoritarian-reinforcement—we should want decisions about
membership in the polity—constitutional personhood decisions—to
be transparent. As Frederick Schauer notes, transparency is a metaphor that connotes the capacity to be “seen without distortion.”341 For
information, facts, or (as in this case) doctrine to be transparent is for
it to be “open and available for examination and scrutiny.”342 In the
context of constitutional personhood decisions, valuing transparency
ultimately serves democratic and constitutional legitimacy in three
See id. at 1160 n.69.
See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Who Decides on Liberty?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1511, 1516–18
(2012) (balancing individual liberty interests and national security); Laurent B. Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1437–39 (1962) (balancing right to freedom of
speech and preservation of law and order); Houlgate, supra note 194, at 84–85 (balancing constitutional rights of children and the “[s]tate’s interest in protecting them from harm”).
337 See Crocker, supra note 336, at 1516–18; Frantz, supra note 336, at 1437–39; Houlgate,
supra note 194, at 84–85.
338 See generally Jacobi et al., supra note 283 (discussing the “attrition” of rights of
parolees).
339 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855, 857 (2006); supra notes 276–92 and accompanying text.
340 Samson, 547 U.S. at 853–54. See generally Jacobi et al., supra note 283.
341 Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1343
(discussing transparency in governmental decisionmaking).
342 Id.
335
336
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ways.343 First, transparency can act as a constraint on judicial decisionmaking by forcing open and reasoned decisions about constitutional
membership.344 Justice Brandeis has famously made this claim, stating
that “[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman.”345 Second, transparency acts as a
facilitator of information to the entire constitutional polity, forcing debate and consideration of community membership questions to the
fore.346 From this perspective, then, transparency forces democratic
engagement and responsibility for inclusion or exclusion of persons
from the polity.347 Finally, and more pragmatically, transparency in
personhood adjudication, as with judicial determinations more generally, enables lower federal courts and litigants to better understand
the conditions under which constitutional rights will be granted or
denied.348
If we take the value of transparency in constitutional personhood
determinations seriously, then what remains is to consider the mechanisms to force transparent decisions. One means by which to force
transparency in doctrinal determinations is to impose a comprehensive and consistent decisional framework whereby all similar analytical questions are treated alike, methodologically speaking. To that
end, the following Part picks up where this one leaves off, and begins
to develop a unified framework for identifying constitutional persons
going forward.
IV.

THE PATH AHEAD: TOWARD A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD

FOR

This Part turns from a perspective of claimant-specific, disaggregated constitutional personhood to an aggregate perspective. This Article takes the view that the pragmatic and definable way to build an
aggregate framework is to examine the Court’s justifications for the
343 Schauer outlines “four values that transparency is thought to serve[;]” however, in the
context of constitutional personhood doctrine, only three of these values seem apt. Id. at 1346.
344 Schauer would term this “Transparency as Democracy.” See id. at 1348–50. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Remarks of Gillian E. Metzger, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 459 (2009)
(analyzing major United States and international transparency politics).
345 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914); Schauer, supra note 341, at 1349 n.52; see also ARCHON FUNG ET. AL., FULL DISCLOSURE:
THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 183 (2007).
346 See Schauer, supra note 341, at 1350 (discussing “Transparency as Efficiency” and
“Transparency as Epistemology”).
347 Id.
348 Metzger, supra note 344, at 459.
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grant or denial of constitutional personhood across the three classes of
litigants outlined in Part II. This Part, then, switches from examining
the Court’s approach and methodologies in each claimant-class to
identifying the commonalities across the Court’s jurisprudence in all
three classes. The resulting analysis suggests that a number of factors
appear across all classes of claimants. Drawing on these factors, the
Part proposes a functional approach to questions of constitutional personhood that pragmatically draws its baseline from the Court’s prior
decisions.349 The Part concludes by previewing the importance of a
unified approach to constitutional personhood for a variety of constitutional personhood claims that could potentially come before the
courts.
A.

Identifying Trends Across Constitutional Rights and Rights
Holders

Drawing on the case studies outlined in Part II, the purpose of
this section is to compile a set of factors that courts can use to guide
future determinations of constitutional personhood.350 Importantly,
this Article does not attempt to identify whether any specific claimant
is vested with constitutional personhood in a specific right. Instead,
the list of factors that originates from the case studies should be seen
as the first attempt in an ongoing discussion to identify constitutional
persons.
At the outset, it is valuable to note that across all classes of claimants, the Court has consistently treated each constitutional personhood claim anew.351 That is, constitutional personhood is not a
universal binary switch; a person is not a constitutional person across
all constitutional rights by virtue of a successful claim for one specific
right.352 Instead, constitutional personhood is switched on—or not—
349 The approach of examining the underlying values or factors of a body of case law and
extrapolating a broader analytical framework or approach is familiar in constitutional rights
scholarship. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 81, at 32 (examining corporate rights jurisprudence
and “[b]uilding on the underlying framework of the jurisprudence” to formulate a general approach to corporate rights claims); Robinson, supra note 21, at 191 (analyzing the values underlying First Amendment protections for religious institutions and employing the values to
promote a broader analytical approach); West, supra note 48, at 1030–31 (analyzing the purpose
for special protections for “the Press” in the First Amendment and extrapolating to a broader
framework).
350 This is similar to the approach I took in the limited context of First Amendment religious institutions. See Robinson, supra note 21, at 225 (formulating the four most significant
factors in identifying a first-order religious institution).
351 See supra notes 57–76 and accompanying text.
352 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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for each individual right claimed by the claimant.353 For example,
when the Court determined that corporations hold constitutional
rights for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure
Clause in See v. City of Seattle,354 it did not hold that corporations are
constitutional rights holders for all, or even all applicable, constitutional rights.355 Rather, the Court made a more narrow decision that
the corporation was vested with constitutional personhood in the specific right at issue.
This is consistent with the Court’s general approach across all
classes of claimant of focusing on the constitutional clause in question
as a first order preference, with the nature of the claimant falling as a
second order consideration. That is, the Court’s predominant focus
has been on the right at issue, rather than the claimant.356 For example, in the felon class the Court in Richardson v. Ramirez first examined the Fourteenth Amendment to determine the scope and
meaning of that provision, before determining whether felons could
be excluded from the Amendment’s protective auspices.357 In the
alienage context, the Court in both Wong Wing v. United States and
Yick Wo v. Hopkins focused on the meaning and purpose of the
Clause before holding that the alien status of the claimant was not a
relevant consideration in determining rights-holder status for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.358 In the context of corporations, moreover, the Court has expressly stated that it was concerned
with the right, and not the nature of the claimant.359 For example, in
Citizens United, the Court specified that the purpose of the right was
to protect speech, and the identity of the speaker was irrelevant.360
Yet, cutting against these examples of the Court’s focus on the
nature of the clause at issue are a number of examples where the
See supra notes 57–76 and accompanying text.
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
355 Id. at 545–46 (holding only that the basic component of a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment is applicable to businesses as well as to residential premises and stating that
constitutional challenges in related programs “can only be resolved . . . on a case-by-case basis
under the general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness”).
356 See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
357 Id.
358 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“Applying this reasoning to the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must be concluded that all persons within the territory of the
United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by those amendments . . . .”); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens.”).
359 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010).
360 Id. (“The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political speech.”).
353
354
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Court has held that the nature of the claimant is determinative of their
constitutional personhood.361 The Court has frequently stated, without explanation, that the status of the claimant renders them unable to
claim constitutional personhood.362 The early corporate constitutional
personhood cases provide a good example of this approach.363 In
these cases, the Court was focused on the nature of the claimant via
various theories of corporate personality.364 In Hale v. Henkel, for example, without any analysis of the Fourth Amendment, the Court
specified that as a distinct legal entity, the corporation was entitled to
constitutional protection against unlawful searches and seizures.365
While the Court’s approach to corporate constitutional personhood
has shifted to analysis of the right as a first order priority, the trend of
examining the claimant without reference to the nature of the right is
not limited to corporate rights-holder claims. Indeed, in both the
alienage and felon categories, the Court has denied constitutional personhood based on the claimant’s status, without any reference to the
nature or scope of the right. In Eisentrager, for example, the Court
proclaimed that the claimant’s enemy status was sufficient reason for
denying him the protections of the Fifth Amendment, without discussion of the purpose, scope, or limits of the provision.366 And felons
have been routinely denied criminal procedure rights “by virtue of
their status alone,” without any consideration of the right being
claimed.367
With that said and as noted above, the Court’s disregard for the
constitutional right is not universal.368 Across all classes of claimants,
the Court has generally prioritized an analysis of the right at issue in
determinations of constitutional personhood.369 In doing so the Court
has relied on one or more interpretive factors to determine the viabil-

361 See supra notes 113–35 (discussing the Court’s early corporate constitutional personhood decisions).
362

Id.

363

Id.

364

Id. See generally Pollman, supra note 21; Pollman, supra note 81, at 50–51.

365

Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).

366

See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 772–73 (1950).

367

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006).

368

See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010).

See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (placing priority on scope of
Fourteenth Amendment over felony status); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238
(1896) (citing the nature of the rights protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as the reason they should not be restricted to citizens).
369
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ity of the constitutional personhood claims.370 The factors that frequently, albeit sporadically, appear in the Court’s constitutional
personhood decisions are text, history, and purpose, including what
this Article will term general boundaries. These factors will be outlined independently.
First, across all categories of claimants, the Court sometimes (but
not always) considers the text of the constitutional provision at issue.371 In Richardson v. Ramirez, for example, the Court focused extensively on the text of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
justify denying voting rights to felons.372 The Court stated that it was
determinative that the express terms of the right permitted states to
disenfranchise felons.373 In Wong Wing, the Court stated that the textual designation of a “person” as the rights holders in the Fifth
Amendment respectively meant that aliens were necessarily rights
holders for the purposes of this constitutional right.374 And in Citizens
United, the Court expressly noted that the text of the First Amendment designated no rights holder, instead it is open-textured, leading
the Court to conclude that, for the purposes of the Speech Clause, the
identity of the speaker is irrelevant. Rather, it is the speech itself that
is of constitutional importance.375
With that said, in at least one of the classes of claimants, even
where the textually designated rights holder clearly includes the claimant, the Court has limited the application to a subset of constitutional
persons. Frequently, the Court has limited the plain meaning of a
term without explanation. For example, in Eisentrager, the Court held
that the extraterritorial aliens were not “persons” for the purposes of
the Fifth Amendment, even though the claimants were clearly natural
persons.376 Likewise, in Verdugo-Urquidez the Court held, without
explanation, that “the people” in the Fourth Amendment did not include aliens.377 Instead, the Court proclaimed, “the people” refers to
a certain subset of that term; specifically those persons who fall within
the national community or have a “sufficient connection to the United
370

See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 722

(2011).
371 See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional
Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1264–65 (2015); Colby, supra note 370, at 721; Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 468–69 (2013).
372 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
373 Id.
374 Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238.
375 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010).
376 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 764 (1950).
377 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 259–60 (1990).
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States.”378 In other instances, however, the Court has limited the textual meaning with reference to other interpretive factors, such as the
history of the right, the purpose of the right, or some conception of a
need for a connection to the United States. To the extent that the
Court relies on these factors to limit the textual category of constitutional rights holders, these factors are considered independently.
Second, the Court has considered history of the right. In a subset
of cases, across all classes of claimants, the Court has occasionally relied on the history of the right at issue to ascertain the appropriate
scope of the class of rights holder.379 In Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.,380
for example, the Court focused almost exclusively on the history of
the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause to determine whether the
intent of the Clause would indicate that corporations are persons entitled to claim its protection.381 Similarly, in First National Bank v. Bellotti,382 the Court held that in determining whether a right should
extend to corporate claimants, the Court must examine the “historic
function” of the right at issue to determine whether personhood in the
right could extend to the claimant.383 Beyond the corporate claimant,
the Court has likewise relied on the history of a right to determine the
extent of its reach. Recall from the prior section that, in the felon
class, in Richardson v. Ramirez, the Court examined both the broader
history and the legislative history of felon disenfranchisement to determine whether the text should be read to permit state disenfranchisement of felons.384
Finally, the Court has also discussed the purpose of the right when
determining whether a person is a rights holder. Sometimes the Court
will state that they are considering the purpose of the right in tandem
with the history of the Clause; for example in Bellotti, the Court specified that it would consider the history and purpose of the Clause to
determine the persons in whom constitutional personhood would
vest.385 However, more frequently, the concept of purpose manifests
in what is best described as general boundaries. These general boundId. at 286; Heeren, supra note 212, at 389.
See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978); Pollman, supra note 81, at 50 (noting that the Court has sometimes looked
at the “history of the right at issue to determine whether to accord it to a corporation . . . .”).
380 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 307.
381 Id. at 311–12.
382 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765.
383 Id. at 799 n.14.
384 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 43–56 (1974).
385 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778–84; see also Pollman, supra note 81, at 53–54 (relying on Bellotti
and proposing a purposive approach to determining corporate constitutional rights holders).
378

R

379

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\84-3\GWN302.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 55

CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD

5-MAY-16

14:46

659

aries, or general principles, do not organically derive from the text of
the right, nor is it clear from the Court’s analysis that the history of
the right supports these extra-textual impositions. Rather, the Court
has inferred some kind of purpose-driven limitation on certain rights.
This is best illustrated by an example. Take the case of Johnson
v. Eisentrager, where alien enemy combatants claimed to be protected
by the Fifth Amendment.386 Recall the Court’s analysis that the Fifth
Amendment was inapplicable because of the lack of territorial connection to the United States and the enemy status of the claimant.387
While it may seem intuitively correct that a person needs some kind of
connection with the United States in order to claim its constitutional
protections, the Court fails to articulate any reasons for its superimposition of a territorial connection.388
This idea of a territorial connection to the United States permeates the alienage jurisprudence.389 Yet, the concept of a “connection”
to the United States is not limited to territorial connection. In both
the alienage and the prisoner classes, the Court has stated, generally
without explanation, that the Constitution generally, and the right at
issue specifically, requires some kind of community membership; this
is a threshold left unexplained except for the fact that the claimant did
not form part of that community.390 The “public functions” exception
that denies an alien constitutional personhood in a subset of Equal
Protection Clause claims is justified by the Court on the basis that the
state has the right to define the boundaries of its political community,
and determining who falls within and who falls outside of those
boundaries is part of the process of democratic self-government.391
Similarly, in Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court specified, without elaboration, that the “people” referenced in the Fourth Amendment is limited to those who form part of the national community, with a
sufficient connection to the United States.392
386

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 764, 773 (1950).

Id. at 778 (“[T]hese prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over which
the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial[,] and
their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.”).
387

388

Id. at 768.

See supra notes 167–226 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s alienage constitutional personhood jurisprudence).
389

390

Id.

See Moore, supra note 43, at 812 (discussing the concept of community membership in
the context of alien constitutional rights).
391

392

R

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272 (1990).
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The phenomenon of superimposition of general limitations is not
limited to aliens.393 In the context of felons, the Court routinely denies rights-holder status to felons who would otherwise clearly fall
within the textual, and perhaps even historic, scope of protection of
the right.394 In the line of cases preceding and including Samson v.
California, for example, while felons clearly fall within the designated
textual rights holder—“the people”—even when considering the
Court’s limitation in Verdugo-Urquidez that this only includes persons
with sufficient connection to the United States,395 the Court still refused to extend the protection of the Fourth Amendment to felons.396
Instead, the Court superimposed a notion of citizenship, implying that
“the people” included only those persons who proved themselves worthy of recognition by the state as members in the political and national
community.397 For the Court, it seems that driving the limited rights
protections for felons is some conception that, by virtue of their status,
these persons are necessarily excludable and excluded from full constitutional membership.398
In summary, the Supreme Court has vacillated between various
factors when determining constitutional personhood, both as within
the same class of claimants and as between the different classes of
claimants.399 This erratic approach indicates the absence of a theoretically unified approach to questions of constitutional personhood.
What we see is a doctrine in disarray, unbound and unhinged from
any clear theoretical or interpretive baseline. As noted in Part III,
this has the effect of producing and reifying inequalities between different persons under the Constitution, as well as leaving the Court
open to criticism of result-driven decisionmaking, whereby the legal
conclusion is a consequences of some ex post, value-based decision on
the validity of including a certain claimant in the constitutional community.400 This thus raises the question whether there is a plausible
393

See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).

394

See, e.g., id.

395

Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265–66.

396

Samson, 547 U.S. at 855–57.

397

Id. at 850–52; see also Jacobi et al., supra note 283, at 905–08.

398

See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850.

R

399 See id. at 855–57; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265–66; Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 764, 773 (1950).
400 Rivard, supra note 19, at 1466 (“In short, the threshold question of constitutional personhood is relegated to the status of a conclusion. Rather than developing a coherent, unified
theory of personhood, the Supreme Court follows a result-oriented approach.”); What We Talk
About, supra note 19, at 1747.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\84-3\GWN302.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 57

CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD

5-MAY-16

14:46

661

aggregate approach to constitutional personhood going forward—a
question taken up in the following Section.
B.

Recalibrating the Personhood Analysis

As it stands, taken in the aggregate the Court’s jurisprudence fails
to provide a consistent methodology for determining constitutional
personhood.401 As we saw in Part I, even within a class of claimant,
sometimes the Court looks to the textually designated rights holder to
determine constitutional personhood, yet other times it ignored the
textual mandate.402 At times, the Court looks to the history of the
right; sometimes not. Sometimes the Court considers the purpose of
the right and superimposes community membership criteria and
sometimes it does not.403 Frequently, the Court does all of these
things without explanation, justification, or analysis.
If we value transparency and consistency in constitutional personhood determinations, how should constitutional law adapt? This
Section proposes a functional purpose and fit analysis when determining whether constitutional personhood vests in the claimant.404 The
proposed functional analysis for constitutional personhood determinations aims to vest constitutional personhood in claimants when it promotes the objectives of the right being claimed. This functional
approach requires the courts to ask two discrete questions: (1) what is
the objective of the right and (2) will extending the right to the claimant fulfill that objective. A functional approach leaves room for the
reality that constitutional personhood means different things in different contexts; that is, whether a person is a constitutional rights holder
or not is dependent on both the nature of the right being claimed and
the class to which the claimant belongs.
Importantly, this Section does not propose to introduce new tests
or methodologies. Instead, the proposed functional analysis draws on
the various interpretive approaches of the Court across all classes of
401 See supra Part II and accompanying notes (analyzing the Court’s constitutional personhood jurisprudence).
402 See supra notes 27–79 and accompanying text.
403 See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
404 For a similar approach in the context of other constitutional rights, see, for example,
Pollman, supra note 81, at 54 (proposing a purposive approach to determining corporate constitutional rights holders); Robinson, supra note 21, at 208–24, 230–33 (identifying the values underlying the First Amendment protections for religious institutions and proposing a functional
approach that identifies as constitutional religious institutions only those institutions that fit with
the purpose of special constitutional protections for religious institutions); West, supra note 81,
at 1068–70 (taking a functional approach to identifying “the press” that best fits with the purpose
of the Speech Clause).
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claimants discussed in Part II.405 For the most part, then, this doctrinal
reform requires only modest shifts on the part of the Court.
In determining purpose and fit, as a threshold matter, courts
should seek to ascertain the objective of the right. In other words,
courts should determine the nature of the activity that the right is
seeking to protect. In answering this question, courts will necessarily
draw on interpretive devices that should be familiar from the case
studies in Part II: the textually-designated rights holder, the history of
the right, the development of the right, and the purpose of the right.
The value in requiring courts to expressly consider each of these factors is a higher likelihood that we will capture the true function of the
right at issue.
Elizabeth Pollman raises the example of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.406 When faced with the question
of corporate constitutional personhood for the purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court engaged in a historic analysis
of the Clause.407 In Murphy v. Waterfront Commissioner,408 the Court
stated that the function of the right, as historically understood, was to
protect against the “cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt,” and to ensure an “accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice[,]” and “respect for the . . . human personality
and of the right of each individual ‘to a private enclave where he may
lead a private life’ . . . .”409 Subsequently the Court held that the privilege was inapplicable to the corporate claimant because there was no
need to protect corporations against the “cruel trilemma.”410 Yet, this
kind of conclusory reasoning is what the functional approach seeks to
avoid.411 The Court did not give the text a glance, where the text of
the right specifies that no “person[s]” shall be forced to incriminate
themselves.412 Given the long tradition of juridical persons as legal
and constitutional persons, this failure is significant.
Further, it is unclear from the Court’s perfunctory analysis why
extending the privilege against self-incrimination to a corporation is
not warranted. That is, why corporations do not need protection
against the “cruel trilemma.” Even more concerning than the Court’s
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412

See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
Pollman, supra note 21, at 1671.
See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 53–57 (1964).
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Id. at 55; see also Pollman, supra note 21, at 1671.
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55; see also Pollman, supra note 21, at 1671.
See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
See Pollman, supra note 21, at 1671–72.
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failure to consistently consider all plausible factors when examining
the purpose of the right is the Court’s failure to consider the second
prong of the functional framework suggested here: whether extending
the right to the claimant fulfills that objective. In the context of corporations, this question is more complicated than for natural persons
and, perhaps, even other purely juridical persons. Answering the
question of whether a corporation fulfills the identified function of a
right requires a clear conception of corporate personhood.413 That is,
in order to answer whether the function of the right is met by extending the right to the corporation, how the Court perceives the corporation will drive the answer.414
While any analysis of corporate personhood is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is important to acknowledge that judicial engagement in the question is critical if courts are to meet the goal of promoting the objective of the right being claimed.415 In addition, while
the question of claimant-fit is less fraught where the claimant is a natural person, it is no less important. In the felon context, for example,
identifying the fit between the function of the right and the felonclaimant forces courts to articulate a conception of the felon in our
polity. Indeed, if a person’s status as a felon renders them a lesser
member of the constitutional polity, and that is driving the Court’s
decisionmaking on felon rights, then it is essential that this understanding be explicitly articulated.
This framework is not novel. It simply draws on the logic, trends,
and assumptions underlying the Court’s constitutional personhood jurisprudence, across all classes of claimants.416 When the Court says
that by virtue of their status aliens are only entitled to lesser privacy
rights, the Court is making assumptions about the function and purpose of the right and the place of aliens in the constitutional community. Likewise, when the Court holds that citizen-felons’
constitutional rights differ from those of non-felon citizens, the Court
is making assumptions about the purpose of, for example, the right to
vote, and the appropriateness of permitting felons to pursue recourse
for that right. And in holding that corporations hold the right to free
Id.
Id.
415 But see generally Pollman, supra note 81; Pollman, supra note 21 (analyzing corporate
constitutional personhood).
416 For similarly pragmatic approaches to reframing constitutional doctrine, see, for example, Robinson, supra note 21, at 185 (arguing for a pragmatic approach to defining “religious
institutions”); Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2438 (2014) (promoting a functional approach to defining “the press”).
413
414
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speech under the First Amendment, the Court is making assumptions
about the purpose of that provision. In many respects what this proposed framework does is to shift the implicit assumptions that drive
judicial decisionmaking to explicit statements.
Although an analysis of the various consequences of a functional
approach to questions of constitutional personhood is beyond the
scope of this Article, taking steps to identify the importance of disaggregating the rights-holder question, as well as moving toward a unified jurisprudential approach, are of pressing concern in light of a
variety of contemporary constitutional personhood issues.
C.

Looking Forward: Constitutional Personhood and Future
Jurisprudence

The first area where constitutional personhood remains a live issue is in claims for further rights protections by the rights holders examined in Part I. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United, commentators began to focus in on a variety of potential
rights claims that corporations could potentially realize, based on the
underlying rationale of the Court’s decision.417 One interesting and
potentially groundbreaking claim is the possibility of a corporate
claim to a constitutional right of privacy.418 Elizabeth Pollman frames
the potential for this claim:
Could a corporation claim a constitutional right to the nondisclosure of its information, as AT&T might have argued in
its recent Freedom of Information Act case? Might a corporation have a privacy claim if the Securities and Exchange
Commission required it to disclose health information about
its CEO, as Apple resisted disclosing information about
Steve Jobs’s declining health? Does the ACLU have a right
to privacy that is violated by the government’s mass collection and surveillance of its phone call metadata?419
Pollman’s questions are not of mere academic interest. As she
notes, in 2011, AT&T claimed a “personal privacy” exemption under
the Freedom of Information Act to prevent public exposure of its docSee Pollman, supra note 81, at 28–29.
Id.; see also William C. Lindsay, Comment, When Uncle Sam Calls Does Ma Bell Have
to Answer?: Recognizing a Constitutional Right to Corporate Informational Privacy, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 915, 926, 935 (1985) (claiming that corporations should have a constitutional right
to informational privacy). But see RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION: SECRECY, ACCESS, AND DISCLOSURE 6, 69 (1980) (arguing that a corporate right to privacy
is “on its face an absurdity”).
419 Pollman, supra note 81, at 27.
417
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uments.420 While the matter was decided on statutory grounds, the
Court specifically noted the potentiality of a constitutional claim, observing that the corporation had not raised a constitutional claim.421
Corporations also feature in the recent debates over religious liberty and the scope of application of the Affordable Care Act, specifically the so-called “Contraception Mandate.”422 Although the
litigation culminated in a Supreme Court decision that focused solely
on the statutory claims made by the corporate litigants, the constitutional issue was argued before the Court, and the potential for a corporate religious liberty claim remains.423 The courts, then, will be
forced to consider whether a corporation is a rights holder for the
purposes of the First Amendment Religion Clauses. In light of the
fraught and socially divisive nature of this determination, it is essential
that the courts adopt an approach to determining corporate constitutional personhood for the purposes of the Religion Clauses.
The difficult, contemporary constitutional personhood issues extend beyond corporate personhood claims to the other categories of
claimants examined in Part II. One core example is the question of
whether aliens and felons have a protected Second Amendment right
to bear arms, a question raised by a number of leading immigration
law scholars.424 In Heller,425 the Court commented that the “the people” of the Second Amendment refers specifically to “law abiding . . .
citizens,”426 and “members of the political community.”427 Thus, with
one comment, the Court has called into question the status of aliens
and felons as rights holders under a constitutional provision that, on
its face, extends to both classes. It is unclear the reasons why the
Court suggested limitations on the textually designated rights
See id. at 28 (citing FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011)).
See AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1181–85.
422 The Affordable Care Act requires that large employers provide health care insurance
that offers basic preventative care—including FDA-approved contraception—at no cost to employers. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713 (2015). See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
423 See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A] for-profit, secular corporation cannot assert a claim under the
Free Exercise Clause.”). See generally THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Micah
Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016).
424 On this question, see generally Gulasekaram, supra note 52; Miller, supra note 98.
425 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment extends to protect an individual’s right to keep firearms).
426 Id. at 635 (“[W]hatever else [the Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms
in defense of hearth and home.”).
427 Id. at 580.
420
421
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holder.428 It could be that these limitations are normatively desirable;
however, a clear and functional analysis is arguably necessary before
any definitive determination of the rights-holder status of, for example, aliens and felons, is determined. The functional, unified framework proposed by this Article aims to get ahead of these complicated
litigation possibilities and guide the courts in the inevitable
determinations.
Second, and more briefly, constitutional personhood remains an
issue for other claimants, including children (who have been treated
differently from adults for the purpose of various constitutional
rights), as well as animals, artificial agents, and the environment.429 A
unified, functional framework for assessing the constitutional rightsbased claims of these persons would ensure transparent and consistent
judicial determinations for all potential constitutional persons.
CONCLUSION
The popular and scholarly focus on corporate constitutional
rights has left the broader question of constitutional personhood
largely unexplored. This Article addresses this broader issue, identifying and examining the Court’s constitutional personhood jurisprudence across three controversial classes of claimants: corporations,
aliens, and felons. This Article demonstrates that the Court’s approach to the questions of whether, and when, a class of claimant is
vested with constitutional personhood is not readily identifiable. Instead, both within and between claimant classes, the Court has vacillated in its approach to the personhood question, relying variously on
the right’s text, history, purpose, or some unstated conception of constitutional membership to grant or deny the personhood claim.
This Article has sought to highlight the previously unaddressed
question of the desirability and possibility of a unified approach to
constitutional personhood.430 By illuminating and analyzing the question of constitutional personhood, this Article reveals that a unified
approach to the personhood question is not only plausible but ulti428 See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV.
145, 165–68, (2008) (examining the Court’s interpretations of the Second Amendment’s terms
“people” and “militia”); Gulasekaram, supra note 52, at 1521 (analyzing the Court’s limited
interpretation of the rights-holding class in Heller and concluding that there is no sustainable
basis to limit the Second Amendment as the Court did).
429 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 67; STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL
RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000) (discussing the legal rights of animals); Houlgate, supra note 194,
at 92–94; Rivard, supra note 19, at 1429.
430 See supra Part IV.
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mately essential for constitutional legitimacy.431 Consequently, this
Article proposes a unified, functional framework to determine who or
what is a constitutional person.432 This functional framework draws
on the various interpretive factors the Court has relied on across the
case studies outlined in Part II and considers both the purpose of the
right at issue, as well as whether vesting constitutional personhood in
the claimant fits with that purpose.433 In outlining this preliminary
framework, this Article seeks to highlight the need for flexibility in
answering difficult questions of constitutional personhood, while at
the same time encouraging consistency and transparency across different classes of claimants.434 Ultimately, these insights add a new and
important dimension to the ongoing discussions about constitutional
personhood and the growing body of jurisprudence concerning constitutional rights.
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